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he topic of errors has received increasing attention in recent years. Most errors are 
easily corrected, however, some of them result in severe negative consequences, 
such as extensive economic or societal damage, or even the loss of lives. The 
negative connotation one has when thinking about errors is therefore not surprising. Errors, 
however, can even have positive consequences, such as innovation, performance, or learning. 
It is widely acknowledged that errors can be a rich source of learning. Nevertheless, little is 
known about which errors prompt learning the most. We believe that the extent of learning 
from errors depends, among others, on error characteristics and the context in which the error 
was made. In particular, we propose that more learning from errors occurs when error 
consequences are severe (as opposed to mild), when the error was made by oneself (as opposed 
to someone else), and when more error management culture is experienced. We also expect 
differences between countries in learning from error.  
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, we focus on the role of error characteristics in learning 
from errors. To test whether the amount of learning from errors depends on the severity of error 
consequences and the agent who made the error, we conducted two vignette experiments 
(Study 1, N = 121 from Germany; Study 2, N = 118 from the United States) in which 
participants responded to error scenarios that happen to employees at work. As expected, 
people learned more from errors in terms of affective error learning (self-reports) and cognitive 
error learning (recall of error situations) if consequences were severe (Study 1 and Study 2) 
and if the error was made by themselves (Study 2).  
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we sought to replicate the results we found in Chapter 
2 and extend them by investigating the role of contextual factors in learning from errors (only 
affective error learning). For this purpose, we conducted vignette experiments in the United 
T 
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States, Germany, and Hungary (N = 588). We found that more affective learning from errors 
occurred when more error management culture was experienced. Furthermore, we found 
differences between countries in affective learning from errors such that participants from the 
United States learned more from errors than participants from Hungary or Germany. This 
relationship was mediated by error management culture. We were also able to replicate the 
results regarding severity of error consequences and agent (who made the error). 
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we shift the focus from the individual to the team and 
investigate whether error management culture not only benefits learning from errors (as shown 
in Chapter 3), but also performance-related outcomes. In particular, we conducted an 
experiment with teams (N = 180 participants (60 triads)), in which we sought to replicate the 
pattern of results concerning error management culture and performance found in previous 
field studies. Furthermore, we aimed to induce an error management culture. We were able to 
induce an error management culture by fostering a positive view on errors and exploration. We 
also found error management culture to benefit performance in a creative problem-solving task. 
However, the effects of our manipulations persisted over time only when culture strength (i.e., 
agreement about culture between group members) was high. 
With our studies, we aim to contribute to a better exploitation of the rich information 
inherent in errors. Our insights can be used as a starting point to develop interventions that aim 
at improving the way people deal with errors in organizations, as well as to raise attention to 
the importance of culture specific issues.  
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 Chapter 1  2 
 
1 
Learning from Errors and  
Error Management Culture:  
An Overview 
1 
“The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred 
by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short 
again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming.” 
(Theodore Roosevelt) 
 
rrors are part of being human and everyday life. We fall while learning to walk, 
we try and err while learning new skills, until we succeed. It is no different in 
working life: we make errors on a daily basis. Do you recall writing a term paper 
for school or making a presentation for work and checking it for typos? And after sending it or 
printing it, finding another typo? Naturally, we try to prevent and avoid errors from happening. 
However, despite best efforts, errors may never be completely avoided (Reason, 1997; Zhao & 
Olivera, 2006). In a rapidly changing world, where organizations' main goal is to be more 
 
The research presented in this dissertation was supervised and supported by Nina Keith and Michael Frese. 
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profitable, efficient, and innovative, in sum more successful than other organizations, one has 
to acknowledge, that “errors are fundamental for human development and organizations” 
(Frese & Keith, 2015, p. 662). Thus, rather than narrowly focusing on error prevention, 
approaches to actively manage errors before negative error consequences unfold should 
prevail. Errors do not inevitably lead to negative consequences, but even have positive 
functions as they may foster learning and innovation (Bauer, Gartmeier, & Harteis, 2010; 
Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Frese & Keith, 2015; Reason, 1990; 
Sitkin, 1992; van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005; Zhao, 2011). 
Errors and Learning from Errors 
An error can be defined as an unintentional deviation from a goal, rule, or standard 
(e.g., Frese & Keith, 2015; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter, & 
Campbell, 1990). For example, when an employee submits a report containing miscalculations 
due to insufficient knowledge without noticing, s/he made an error. Some errors, such as typos 
or misspells can be easily corrected. Other errors can result in severe negative consequences, 
such as substantial economical or societal damage, and even the loss of lives.  
Errors should be distinguished from violations, inefficiencies, and failures. A violation 
is an intentional deviation from a norm or goal (Frese & Keith, 2015). Inefficiencies are actions 
where the goal is achieved, however, only with detours (Frese & Keith, 2015). Failures refer 
to negative outcomes (Frese & Keith, 2015). “Errors can be detected and corrected 
immediately” and therefore do not inevitably lead to negative error consequences, thus, to 
failures (Frese & Keith, 2015, p. 663). Errors can even lead to positive consequences, such as 
learning (e.g., always checking if the report contains up-to-date information).  
Action regulation theory (e.g., Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1973, 2003; Zacher & 
Frese, 2018) considers humans as active agents. Humans act and interact with the (work) 
environment. While doing so, humans develop and refine their mental models of the system or 
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the task (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1973, 2003; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 
2003). In that sense, erroneous actions are critical for learning, as they serve important 
informatory functions. Errors provide negative but informative feedback that predicts learning, 
even more so than positive feedback (Frese & Keith, 2015; Zacher & Frese, 2018). Other 
scholars agree that errors can be a rich source of learning (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; 
Dormann & Frese, 1994; Edmondson, 1996; Ellis, Carette, Anseel, & Lievens, 2014; Frese & 
Keith, 2015; Heimbeck, et al., 2003; Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996; Keith & Frese, 2008; 
Sitkin, 1992). Errors signify that something went wrong and indicate that some (re)action is 
required (Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2011). Errors 
provide a deeper insight into the system in which the error occurred, and contribute to 
exploration and experimentation, as well as the development of new ideas (Dormann & Frese, 
1994; Frese & Keith, 2015). In most cases, errors occur unexpectedly – errors are “negative 
surprises” (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005, p. 300) that catch attention. The amount of attention 
devoted to errors may evoke a deeper cognitive processing of the errors (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972). Thereby, errors foster learning.  
However, it is unclear which types of errors foster learning the most, although it seems 
obvious that errors differ in the extent to which they affect learning (e.g., Sitkin, 1992; Cannon 
& Edmondson, 2005). Only by understanding which factors determine learning from errors can 
organizations develop appropriate interventions to improve the way people deal with errors. In 
this dissertation, one of our aims is to investigate to what extent learning from errors depends 
on error characteristics and the context in which the error was made. The following research 
questions regarding learning from errors are addressed in this dissertation: 
Research questions 1: Do error characteristics and the context in which the error 
happened affect the amount of learning from errors? Specifically, does the amount of 
learning from errors depend on error characteristics, such as severity of error 
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consequences or the agent who made the errors, and on contextual factors such as the 
organizational culture (i.e., error management culture) or country? 
Error Management and Error Management Culture 
General strategies of how to deal with errors can be roughly classified in either error 
prevention or error management approaches (Frese, 1991, 1995; Goodman, Ramanujam, 
Carroll, Edmondson, Hofmann, & Sutcliffe, 2011). Error prevention focuses on eliminating 
error before they could even occur (see Figure 1.1 arrow between “action” and “errors”). Yet, 
despite best efforts to prevent errors, it is impossible to eliminate errors completely (e.g., 
Reason, 1997). Purely relying on error prevention, thus, has its limits. Rather, error prevention 
should be supplemented by strategies that are directed at effectively dealing with errors after 
they have occurred and before negative consequences unfold (Frese, 1991, 1995). Error 
management is a perspective towards errors that distinguishes errors from their consequences. 
Error management is directed at effectively dealing with errors after they have occurred but 
before negative consequences can unfold (see Figure 1.1 arrow between “errors” and 
“consequences”). Moreover, error management aims to foster positive consequences that may 
result from errors, such as long-term-learning, innovations, and performance (e.g., Sitkin, 
1992; Keith & Frese, 2011, 2015; Fischer, Frese, Mertins, & Hardt-Gawron, 2018).  
 
Figure 1.1. Error prevention and error management in the action-error cycle (adapted from 
Hofmann & Frese, 2011, p. 31). 
 
Table 2.1Figure 2.1. Error prevention and error management in the action-error cycle 
(adapted from Hofmann & Frese, 2011, p. 31). 
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As every organization is confronted with the potential of making errors, most 
organizations implicitly or explicitly adopt some shared norms, values, practices, and 
procedures of dealing with errors—i.e., a culture (Schein, 2004) of dealing with errors or error 
culture. One particular form of such an error culture is the concept of error management culture 
which applies the principles of error management to the unit level. The idea is that members of 
a unit (e.g., an organization, a department or a team within an organization) share a system of 
norms and values as well as common practices and procedures (Schein, 2004) directed at error 
management (van Dyck et al., 2005). Error management culture is a culture in which team 
members do not have to fear being blamed for errors they have made, and where exploration 
and experimentation is enabled. Error management culture has been shown to benefit 
organizational outcomes such as safety, innovativeness, and performance (Hofmann & Mark, 
2006; Keith & Frese, 2011; van Dyck et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 2018). However, the question 
whether and how an error management culture can be induced remained unanswered. 
Understanding how an error management culture may be induced does not only contribute to 
our theoretical knowledge but is also relevant for practitioners in order to understand drivers 
of change. The following research questions regarding error management culture are addressed 
in this dissertation: 
Research questions 2: Is it possible to induce an error management culture in teams? If 
so, how? Can we replicate the beneficial effect of error management culture on 
performance found in field studies under standardized experimental settings? 
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Overview of the Present Research 
The following three chapters aim at answering the aforementioned research questions. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus on our first category of research questions, namely the error 
characteristics and contextual factors that may affect learning from errors. Chapter 4 focuses 
on our second category of research questions, namely whether and how error management 
culture can be induced. Each chapter comprises several empirical studies and test specific 
hypotheses regarding learning from errors or error management culture. While the chapters 
refer to one another, they contain separate theoretical introductions, method and results 
sections, and discussions. This allows readers to read them independently from each other. 
Overview of Chapter 2 
While scholars agree that errors can be a rich source of learning (e.g., Dormann & Frese, 
1994; Frese & Keith, 2015; Heimbeck, et al., 2003; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Zakay, Ellis, & 
Shevalsky, 2004), research is scarce on error characteristics that make learning from errors 
more or less likely. In Chapter 2, we thus focus on error characteristics that may influence the 
amount of learning from errors, namely on (a) severity of error consequences and (b) the agent 
who made the error. We assume that severity of error consequences affects learning from errors 
positively, that is the more severe the consequences, the more learning from errors will occur. 
Our assumption is based on the fact that humans devote more attention to negative than to 
positive information (Vaish, Grossman, & Woodward, 2008; Zakay et al., 2004). Also, errors 
with mild consequences may be more easily overlooked or ignored (Baumard & Starbuck, 
2005). Furthermore, we assume that more learning from errors occurs when the agent of the 
error is oneself (i.e., the error is made by oneself) as opposed to someone else. Although people 
can learn from observing others (Bandura, 1986), an error that was made by oneself should 
have high personal relevance, which attracts a higher degree of attention (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, 
& Goldman, 1981).  
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While other error characteristics may also be important for learning from errors, we 
chose to focus in particular on these two error characteristics for the following reasons. First, 
if severity of error consequences would affect learning from error in our study, this would 
underline the clear distinction error management theory makes between the error and its 
consequence (Frese & Keith, 2015; Hofmann & Frese, 2011). Second, as previous studies 
regarding severity of error consequences were mostly field studies (e.g., Homsma, van Dyck, 
De Gilder, Koopman, & Elfring, 2009; Zakay et al., 2004) more systematic research is needed. 
Third, both theory (Bandura, 1986) and empirical evidence (Kim & Miner, 2007) suggest that 
learning from others' errors is possible. Still, the error characteristic agent (who made the error) 
has not been explicitly considered in previous research. 
In two studies (Study 1: N = 121 work-experienced adults from Germany (Mage = 36.92 
years, SDage = 15.09; 61.2 % female); Study 2: N = 118 work-experienced adults from the 
United States (Mage = 35.76 years, SDage = 10.54; 35 % female)), we experimentally tested our 
assumptions by prompting participants to react to error scenarios (vignettes) that reflect 
situations typical for employees at work (within-participants design). The baseline vignette that 
described the error and the situation in which the error occurred was identical across 
experimental conditions, but the consequences that developed from the same error and the 
agent who made the error varied. We counterbalanced the order of presentation and scenario-
factor combinations to control for potential material effects. After each error scenario 
participants had to respond to manipulation checks and indicate how much they learned from 
the error (i.e., affective error learning; 3 of the 4 items of the subscale “learning from errors” 
of the Error Orientation Questionnaire (EOQ; Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999)). After 
a filler task, participants had to recall as many of the previously presented error scenarios in as 
much detail as possible (i.e., cognitive error learning). As guiding questions, we asked for the 
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agent who made the error, the error situation, as well as the error consequence. Two raters 
independently coded whether participants correctly recalled the error scenarios. 
In line with our assumptions, severity of error consequences increased learning from 
errors: participants not only reported to learn more (affective error learning) from errors with 
severe consequences than mild consequences, but they also recalled error situations (cognitive 
error learning) better when error consequences were severe. Participants also learned more 
from an error (only affective error learning) if the error was made by themselves as opposed to 
by someone else. With our studies, we aim to contribute to the relatively small body of research 
regarding error characteristics that may affect learning. Understanding the error characteristics 
that influence learning from errors enables a better exploitation of the rich information inherent 
in errors. 
Overview of Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, we sought to replicate the results from Chapter 2 regarding error 
characteristics and learning from errors, but also to extend them by investigating the role of 
contextual factors in learning from errors. In particular, we wanted to investigate (a) the 
relationship of organizational error culture (i.e., shared norms and beliefs about errors) and 
learning from errors, and (b) whether there are country differences in error management 
culture, and (c) learning from errors. We also explored whether (d) potential country 
differences in learning from errors may be due to differences in error management culture.  
Both theoretical (e.g., Gelfand, Frese, & Salmon, 2011) and empirical evidence (e.g., 
Davis, Bryant, Tedrow, Liu, Selgrade, & Downey, 2005; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998) suggest 
that the way people deal with errors varies across countries. Learning from errors may thus 
differ as well. We deem the GLOBE (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) 
dimension of uncertainty avoidance to be particularly important for the way people deal with 
errors (i.e., error management culture) and consequently for learning from errors. The way 
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people deal with uncertainty may influence how people consider and deal with occurring errors 
(i.e., error management culture), as errors are always, to a certain extent, ambiguous. This, in 
turn, may influence how much learning from errors occurs. In countries low in uncertainty 
avoidance, errors may be evaluated more positively (Gelfand et al., 2011). A positive 
evaluation of errors may then make error management culture more likely. In an error 
management culture where errors are considered as chances to learn, learning should be 
fostered (e.g., Frese & Keith, 2015). As there is an ongoing debate about whether country 
rankings can be used to predict individual behavior (e.g., Bond, 2002; Brewer & Venaik, 2012, 
2014; Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006), we exercise caution and decided to put forth open 
research questions regarding country differences in favor of concrete hypotheses. 
To test our assumptions, we studied samples (N = 588) of work-experienced adults of 
three different countries, namely the United States, Hungary, and Germany, and assessed error 
management culture. We chose these countries as they score differently on the GLOBE 
uncertainty avoidance societal practices dimension (Hungary is low on uncertainty avoidance, 
the United States range in the middle, and Germany scores high; de Luque & Javidan, 2004). 
Design and procedure of Chapter 3 were similar to those of the studies from Chapter 2, with 
the following differences. First, we included the country in which the sample was collected in 
as a between-participants factor. Second, the present study only employs the affective error 
learning measure, as Chapter 2 provided evidence that the affective error learning measure is 
an adequate proxy for learning from errors. Third, the present study used three levels of the 
experimental factor agent (self, close colleague [i.e., from the same company], and distant 
colleague [i.e., from a different company]). According to social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 2004), there is a “tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in evaluations and 
behavior” (p. 281). This would imply that the degree of learning that occurs might not only 
depend on the dichotomy (self and other) but may vary gradually with the agent. As a result of 
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in-group favoritism, learning might be higher from errors made by an in-group member (e.g., 
close colleague), than from errors made by an out-group member (e.g., distant colleague). 
We obtained the same pattern of results regarding error characteristics as in Chapter 2: 
the amount of learning from errors depended on the severity of error consequences and the 
agent who made the error. Furthermore, we found error management culture to be beneficial 
for learning from errors. We also found differences between countries in error management 
culture and learning from errors in that participants from the United States reported more error 
management culture and learned more from errors than participants from Hungary or Germany. 
The relationship between country and learning from errors was mediated by error management 
culture. Only by understanding which error characteristics and how the cultural context 
determine learning from errors can organizations develop appropriate interventions to improve 
learning from errors. 
Overview of Chapter 4 
In Chapter 3, we demonstrated, inter alia, that error management culture is beneficial 
for learning from errors. In Chapter 4, we shift the focus from the individual to the team level, 
and explore whether error management culture is not only beneficial for learning from errors, 
but also for performance. When error management culture is high, team members do not have 
to fear blame or punishment and learning from errors and open communication about errors is 
encouraged (van Dyck et al., 2005; Frese & Keith, 2015). These enable quick error detection, 
damage-control, exploration and experimentation, which in turn may foster performance (van 
Dyck et al., 2005; Dormann & Frese, 1994; Keith & Frese, 2008, 2011). Previous studies have 
already investigated the effect of error management culture on performance and found error 
management culture to be beneficial for performance-related outcomes (e.g., Fischer et al., 
2018; van Dyck et al., 2005; Hofmann & Mark, 2006). However, these studies were field 
studies. While field studies have the advantage of high ecological validity, the higher 
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ecological validity can come at the expense of lower internal validity. Furthermore, these 
studies left the question open whether and how an error management culture can be induced in 
teams. While literature on organizational culture suggests that culture can be established and 
changed (e.g., Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Sathe & Davidson, 2000), the question still remains 
how an error management culture can be established. In our study, we thus aimed to induce an 
error management culture in teams and also aimed to replicate the pattern of results concerning 
error management culture and performance found in field studies under standardized 
experimental conditions. For this purpose, we developed two different error management 
culture manipulations and conducted a laboratory experiment with newly formed teams (N = 
180 participants (60 triads)). Our manipulations focused on how participants should deal with 
errors in the process of the team task. We developed one error management culture 
manipulation based on normative social influence. We chose to base our manipulation on 
normative social influence because normative social influence is considered as a key factor in 
the formation of organizational culture (Ashforth, 1985). Also, several studies demonstrated 
the power of normative social influence on people's behavior (e.g., Sherif, 1935; Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955; for a review see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Groups that were manipulated with 
an error management culture manipulation based on normative social influence received error 
management culture principles and practices as written descriptive norms. We developed 
another manipulation based on error management training instructions. We chose to base our 
manipulation on error management training instructions because error management training 
has been shown to be an effective training method and to be beneficial for performance (e.g., 
Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005; for a meta-analysis see Keith & Frese, 2008). 
Error management training, however, focuses on the individual level. In our study, we aimed 
at inducing error management culture by using error management training instructions but 
applying them to the team level. Groups that were manipulated with an error management 
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culture manipulation based on error management training instructions were explicitly 
encouraged to explore the task, make errors, and learn from them as a group.  
The groups in our study were assigned to one of three experimental conditions: (1) Error 
management culture manipulation based on error training instructions, (2) Error management 
culture manipulation based on normative social influence, or (3) Error prevention culture. The 
groups had to work on creative problem-solving tasks, namely, the marshmallow challenge and 
a marble run task. In the first task, the groups' goal was to build the highest standing structure 
from spaghettis with a marshmallow on top. In the second task, the groups had to build the 
highest functioning marble run, to use as many pieces as possible to build the marble run, and 
to create a route in which the marble runs as long as possible. We chose these tasks because, 
among others, team performance can be measured meaningfully and objectively, they entail 
certain degrees of freedom with regard to how to arrive at a solution, and participants can 
clearly see and know when they made an error.  
We were able to successfully manipulate teams' perception of error management culture 
in the first task with an error management culture manipulation based on error training 
instructions. Furthermore, we were able to replicate the beneficial effect of error management 
culture on performance found in previous field studies. However, the results persisted over 
time (that is, for a second team task) only when culture strength (i.e., agreement about culture 
between group members) was high (Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002). Our results not 
only contribute to the theoretical understanding of error management culture but are also 
relevant for practitioners in order to gain insights on how an error management culture can be 
established. 
The last chapter (Chapter 5) summarizes the main results of the empirical studies 
presented in Chapters 2 to 4 and provides a general discussion of the present research, 
theoretical and practical implications, and also suggests ideas for future research.   
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2 
Are all Errors Created Equal? Testing the 




Individuals and organizations can learn from errors. However, little is 
known which error characteristics make learning from errors more or 
less likely. We argue that otherwise identical errors lead to more 
learning if consequences associated with the error are severe rather 
than mild and when the error was made by oneself as opposed to by 
someone else. We experimentally tested our assumptions by prompting 
participants to react to error scenarios that reflect situations typical for 
employees at work (Study 1, N = 121 from Germany; Study 2, N = 118 
from the United States). As expected, severity of error consequences 
increased learning from errors both in terms of affective error learning 
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and cognitive error learning (Study 1 and 2). Learning from errors also 
depended on the agent (i.e., the person who makes the error) (Study 2): 
people learned more from an error if they were the ones who made the 
error (as opposed to someone else). The present research 
experimentally confirms and extends previous correlational studies and 




he topic of learning from errors at work is increasingly gaining attention in applied 
psychology and management research. Errors are a rich source of information, as 
they unveil that something went wrong. Scholars agree that errors can foster 
learning (e.g., Dormann & Frese, 1994; Edmondson, 1996; Ellis, Carette, Anseel, & Lievens, 
2014; Frese & Keith, 2015; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003; Ivancic & Hesketh, 
1995/1996; Keith & Frese, 2008; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Zakay, Ellis, & Shevalsky, 2004). It 
also seems intuitive that errors vary in the amount of learning they foster (Sitkin, 1992; Cannon 
& Edmondson, 2005). However, research is scarce on error characteristics that influence 
learning from errors. Understanding the error characteristics that influence learning from errors 
enables taking advantage of errors. 
In the present research, we systematically test the effects of error characteristics that 
influence learning from errors by means of vignette experiments. We investigate two error 
characteristics, namely (a) severity of error consequences (mild vs. severe) (Study 1 and 2) and 
(b) agent (i.e., the person who makes the error; error made by oneself vs. error made by 
someone else) (Study 2). More specifically, we propose that (a) severe error consequences lead 
to more learning than mild consequences and that (b) people learn more from an error if they 
are the ones who made the error (as opposed to someone else).  
With our studies, we aim to contribute to existing literature in the following ways. First, 
T 
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research is scarce on error characteristics that may affect the amount of learning from errors. 
Our studies shall add to the relatively small body of research regarding error characteristics 
and their relation to learning (Homsma, van Dyck, De Gilder, Koopman, & Elfring, 2009; 
Zakay et al., 2004). Second, previous studies in this area were mostly field studies (Homsma 
et al., 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010). While field studies have the advantage of high ecological 
validity, higher ecological validity can come at the expense of lower internal validity. In 
organizations, several confounding attributes may affect learning from errors, which leaves the 
question of causality unanswered (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002; Frese & Keith, 2015). 
By investigating learning from errors under standardized experimental conditions, it is possible 
to account for confounding attributes. In the following section, we define relevant concepts and 
develop our hypotheses in more detail. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Errors and Learning from Errors 
Definitions. Errors are unintentional deviations from a goal, rule, or standard (Frese & 
Keith, 2015; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Reason, Manstead, Stradling, 
Baxter, & Campbell, 1990). For example, when an employee makes a planning mistake in a 
budget plan or a time schedule, s/he made an error. Errors can be distinguished from violations. 
A violation is an intentional deviation from a norm or goal (Frese & Keith, 2015). It has to be 
noted that errors do not inevitably lead to negative error consequences (Frese & Keith, 2015). 
Errors can even lead to positive consequences, such as learning (e.g., always double-checking 
the calculations). 
Learning from errors. Learning can be defined as “changes in the knowledge, skills, 
or attitudes” (Kraiger, Passmore, dos Santos, & Malvezzi, 2015, p. 4) and behavior (Bell, 
Tannenbaum, Ford, Noe, & Kraiger, 2017; Baldwin & Ford, 1988). How much learning from 
errors occurs may depend on the amount of attention an error receives. Errors signify that 
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something is wrong (Sitkin, 1992), and that some (re)action is required. In most cases, errors 
occur unexpectedly – errors are “negative surprises” (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005, p. 300) 
that catch attention. The amount of attention devoted to errors may evoke a deeper cognitive 
processing of the errors. Thereby, errors foster learning. Different error characteristics may 
determine the amount of attention a person devotes to an error, and thus the amount of learning 
from errors that can occur. Severity of error consequences and the agent of the error are two 
such error characteristics. 
It has to be noted that learning from errors does not only encompass avoiding the same, 
specific error in the future (Frese & Keith, 2015). Learning from errors can be conceptualized 
in different ways. Learning does not necessarily require a change in behaviors (Argote & 
Miron-Spektor, 2011). A review over the evolution of training and development research and 
how learning has been conceptualized in the Journal of Applied Psychology over the past 100 
years (Bell et al., 2017) has identified affective, cognitive, and skill (behavioral) outcomes of 
learning (Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993). Affective outcomes may include increased motivation 
or changes in attitudes. Cognitive outcomes may include acquired knowledge, such as the ease 
of retrieval in terms of memorizing and recollecting knowledge (Metcalfe, 2017). Skill 
outcomes may include mastery of tasks (Bell et al., 2017). As we will describe in more detail, 
the present research focused on affective error learning in terms of attitudes towards errors and 
cognitive error learning in terms of recall of error situations.  
In the following, we will develop hypotheses on how error characteristics may affect 
these learning outcomes. In particular, we focus on two error characteristics, namely severity 
of error consequences and the agent who made the error. We acknowledge that other error 
characteristics may also be important for learning from errors. We, however, chose to focus in 
particular on these two error characteristics for the following reasons. 1) We chose to focus on 
severity of error consequences for two reasons. First, error management theory (Frese & Keith, 
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2015; Hofmann & Frese, 2011) disentangles errors from their potential consequences. If 
severity of error consequences would indeed affect learning in our study, this would clearly 
underline the importance of this theoretical distinction. Second, although severity of error 
consequences has been explicitly considered in previous research (e.g., Homsma et al., 2009; 
Zakay et al., 2004), most studies regarding severity of error consequences were field studies. 
Furthermore, there is a controversial debate on whether more learning occurs from errors with 
severe or mild consequences (e.g., Sitkin, 1992; Zakay et al., 2004). In sum, more systematic 
research is needed regarding severity of error consequences. By experimentally investigating 
the effect of severity of error consequences on learning from errors, we seek to provide more 
systematic research. 2) We chose to focus on agent (who made the error) for the following 
reason. Both theory (Bandura, 1986) and empirical evidence regarding learning from similar 
firms' failures (Kim & Miner, 2007) suggest that learning from others' errors is possible. Still, 
the error characteristic agent (who made the error) has not been explicitly considered in 
previous research, nor has it been experimentally tested. If severity of error consequences and 
agent would indeed affect learning from errors in our study, that would have important practical 
implications in terms of maximizing learning from errors in organizations. In the following, 
we will develop our hypotheses in more detail. 
Error Characteristics that Influence Learning from Errors 
Severity of error consequences. Learning from errors may depend on the severity of 
error consequences. The debate on whether more learning occurs from errors with severe or 
mild consequences is controversial. One line of research argues that more learning occurs from 
errors with mild or moderate consequences (e.g., Sitkin, 1992; Hayward, 2002; Khanna, Guler, 
& Nerkar, 2016). This follows the proposition that while error consequences need to be severe 
enough to attract attention (e.g., Homsma et al., 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010), severe error 
consequences may pose a threat to humans. The perceived threat may lead to defensiveness 
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and denial, which impedes learning. This line of argumentation received some supportive and 
some less supportive results (Hayward, 2002; Homsma et al., 2009; Khanna et al., 2016; 
Madsen & Desai, 2010; Zakay et al., 2004). The other line of research argues that more learning 
occurs from errors with severe consequences. In general, humans devote more attention to 
negative than to positive information (Vaish, Grossman, & Woodward, 2008; Zakay et al., 
2004). Errors with mild consequences are considered of less importance (Cannon & 
Edmondson, 2005). Errors with mild consequences may be more easily overlooked or ignored 
(Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). Thus, the learning potential of errors with mild consequences 
cannot fully be used. We follow the second line of argumentation that severe error 
consequences foster learning. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1: Severity of error consequences increases learning from errors; the more 
severe the consequences, the more learning from errors will occur. 
Agent of the error. Who made the error can also influence learning from error. Who 
made the error may influence the attention given to an error, and thus how much learning 
occurs: people may learn more from errors made by themselves as opposed to errors made by 
someone else. An error that was made by oneself should have high personal relevance, which 
attracts a higher degree of attention (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). The amount of 
learning that can occur may thus be the highest when an error was made by oneself. 
Nevertheless, learning is likely to occur also from errors made by others. According to social 
learning theory (Bandura, 1986), people also learn from observing others. However, errors 
made by others may not necessarily be considered personally relevant, as the errors may be 
attributed to the other person's incompetence or negligence (Frese & Keith, 2015). 
Consequently, errors made by others may receive less attention and be more easily overlooked 
or ignored than errors made by oneself. In turn, learning is less likely to occur. We thus assume 
less learning to occur from errors made by someone else than from errors made by oneself: 
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Hypothesis 2: Learning from errors depends on the agent (i.e., the person who made the 
error): More learning from errors occurs when the error is made by oneself as opposed 
to by someone else. 
Overview of Studies 
We tested our two hypotheses, namely, the effect of severity of error consequences and 
agent on learning from errors, in two experiments. In Study 1, we tested the effect of severity 
of error consequences. In Study 2, we tested the effect of severity of error consequences and 
agent on learning from errors. Both experiments used vignette methodology. Our two studies 
differed with regard to the participant samples. Study 1 was conducted in Germany and Study 
2 in the United States. 
Study 1 
Method 
Sample. Participants of Study 1 were 121 work-experienced adults (M = 15.67 years 
of work experience, SD = 13.87) from Germany.1 The majority (81.8 %) were currently 
employed (full-time or part-time) at various organizations, with some of them (19 %) holding 
a leadership position; 7.4 % were full-time students with work experience; the remaining 
participants were currently on parental leave, job seeking, or retired (10.8 %). Mean age was 
36.92 years (SD = 15.09) and 61.2 % were female. Participants were recruited via social media 
and social networks as well as on campus of a mid-sized German university. Participation was 
compensated with 8 Euros (approx. 9.5 US$) or partial course credit.  
 
1 Of the 122 participants originally recruited, one did not complete the experiment in one session but dispersed 
completion over several days. We excluded this participant's data from further analyses.   
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Experimental design and procedure. We used an experimental vignette methodology 
in a within-participants design with severity of error consequences (mild vs. severe) as 
experimental factor. 
Participants read six scenarios in which we described error situations that varied with 
regard to severity of error consequences (implemented by three vignettes per level). To avoid 
sequence, practice, and boredom effects, we counterbalanced the order of presentation and 
scenario-factor combinations (Girden, 1992). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two permutations of material versions. For later statistical analyses, we used material version 
as control variable. 
In the online experiment, participants were first welcomed and briefly introduced to the 
study's purpose and procedure. Participants then filled out a questionnaire on demographics. 
Subsequently, participants were presented with the first experimentally manipulated error 
scenario. Participants were asked to read the error scenario carefully and to imagine themselves 
in the described situation. Subsequently, items were presented that constituted the manipulation 
checks and the first dependent variable (affective error learning). This procedure was repeated 
for each successive error scenario. Participants then worked on a filler task that lasted about 30 
minutes. Afterwards, participants were asked to recall as many of the previously presented 
error scenarios (cognitive error learning) in as much detail as possible (this constituted our 
second dependent variable). Up to this point, participants had been unaware that they will be 
asked to recall the scenarios. Participants then completed a questionnaire on error management 
culture in their respective organization. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
compensated. 
Experimental material. The vignettes (i.e., error scenarios) described typical errors at 
work (for a sample vignette, see Appendix A). The vignettes were developed based on actual 
errors as reported by managers in interviews unrelated to the present studies (the interviews 
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were about errors and error management in organizations). All scenarios were developed and 
pilot tested with the two goals to arrive at (a) a scenario as realistic as possible and (b) at a 
distinction as clear as possible between degrees of the experimental factor severity of error 
consequences (i.e., mild or severe). The manipulation of the experimental factor severity of 
error consequences was implemented by systematically varying the endings of error scenarios. 
More specifically, the baseline vignette that described the error and the situation in which the 
error occurred was identical across experimental conditions, but the consequences that 
developed from the same error varied. For example, one scenario described an employee 
having placed a wrong order of materials based on an outdated project plan. In the condition 
representing mild error consequences, the employee is able to return the surplus materials and 
to be reimbursed. In the condition representing severe error consequences, the supplier does 
not accept a return of goods. The employee causes a significant economic damage, as the 
surplus material cannot be used elsewhere in the company.  
Measures.  
Manipulation checks. After reading the vignettes and before the first dependent 
variable was assessed, participants responded to manipulation checks that probed whether 
participants perceived the severity of the error consequences in the intended way. After reading 
each vignette, participants were asked to indicate how severe they think the situation is and 
how negatively they evaluate the situation. We asked participants two questions (e.g., “How 
negative do you evaluate the described situation?”) to which they responded on a 5-point Likert 
scale. In addition, we asked them to indicate on a 5- point Kunin face scale how they would 
feel in the described situation (Kunin, 1955). As expected, we found large effects both for the 
two questions, F(1,120) = 291.33, p < .001, hp2 = .71, and for the Kunin item, F(1,120) = 
190.01, p < .001, hp2 = .61, indicating that participants perceived the severity of error 
consequences in the intended way. 
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Dependent variables. Following the multidimensionality perspective on learning (e.g., 
Bell et al., 2017; Kraiger et al., 1993), we address two aspects by which learning can be 
conceptualized: we assessed affective error learning by using a self-report measure, and 
cognitive error learning in terms of recall of error situations. We assessed affective error 
learning with 3 of the 4 items of the subscale “learning from errors” of the Error Orientation 
Questionnaire (EOQ; Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999)2. The EOQ is designed to 
measure “attitudes to and coping with errors at work” (Rybowiak et al., 1999, p. 527) of 
individuals or groups. We slightly modified item wordings to fit the presently used vignettes. 
For example, the original item “My mistakes help me to improve my work” was changed to 
“This mistake helps me to improve my work”. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale. 
In the present study, median Cronbach's alpha was .88 across experimental conditions. For 
cognitive error learning (i.e., recall of error situations)3, participants were asked to recall as 
many of the previously presented error scenarios in as much detail as possible. In order to 
facilitate recall, we asked for the error situation, as well as the error consequences. Two raters 
independently assigned the values 0 (incorrect), 1 (partially correct), or 2 (fully correct) to the 
recall of the error situation and to the error consequences, respectively, resulting in a maximum 
score of 4. Inter-rater agreement was high, with a median ICC(3,2) of .99 (range .96 to .99) 
across the scenarios. 
Filler task (cognitive ability test). As filler task (after presentation of error scenarios 
and before recall of error scenarios), we used a freely available German cognitive ability test 
(Satow, 2017) that measures numerical skills (22 items; Cronbach's alpha = .70) and spatial-
 
2 We did not include the fourth item of the scale “Mistakes provide useful information for me to carry out my 
work” in our study. In the German version of the scale, this item includes a hypothetical construction or “if 
clause” (“If an error happens to me…”). We found this item to be too complex and unsuitable for our purposes, 
and barely equivalent to the English translation. In order to minimize differences in different language versions 
of the questionnaire, we decided not to include this item in our study. 
3 Originally, we had planned to additionally include multiple-choice test items, but the items were too easy (75 to 
90 % correct answers across conditions) and produced ceiling effects. 
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visual skills (12 items; Cronbach's alpha =.38) (overall Cronbach's alpha = .67). Our primary 
goal was to use this test as a filler task, as it is common to use unrelated filler tasks in 
experiments that use recall tests. Our second goal was to use it as a potential control variable 
for the recall task because we suspected that performance on this cognitive measure may be 
influenced by participants' cognitive abilities4.  
Results and Discussion 




4 We reran all analyses with cognitive abilities included as a covariate, but the pattern and magnitude of effects 
were unaltered. 
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Main effect of severity of error consequences. Hypothesis 1 predicted a main effect 
of severity of error consequences on learning from errors in that learning is higher for errors 
with severe consequences. We first tested this hypothesis simultaneously for both the affective 
and cognitive dependent variables, using repeated measures MANOVA. In support of 
Hypothesis 1, severity of error consequences had a main effect on learning from errors in that 
more learning occurred from errors with severe than with mild consequences, F(2,118) = 7.74, 
p < .001, hp2 = .12. As indicated by additional post-hoc univariate analyses, this effect held for 
both dependent variables, F(1,119) = 5.34, p < .05, hp2 = .04, and F(1,119) = 10.37, p < .01, 
hp2 = .08 for affective and cognitive learning from errors, respectively (see Figure 2.1, Panels 
a and b)5.  
 
5 The other effects in the ANCOVAs (not pertinent to the hypothesis) were as follows. For the affective learning 
measure: no main effect of material version, F(1,119) =0.08, p = .77, hp2 = .00, no interaction effect of material 
version with severity of error consequences, F(1,119) = 2.22, p = .14, hp2 = .02. For the cognitive learning 
measure (recall of error situations): no main effect of material version, F(1,119) = 1.50, p = .22, hp2 = .01, 
interaction effect of material version with severity of error consequences, F(1,119) = 9.40, p < .01, hp2 = .07, 
indicating that the hypothesized effect of the independent variable was present on average but differed in 
magnitude across material versions. Such interaction effects are common in experiments that include multiple 
naturalistic materials and they underscore the appropriateness of systematically varying and statistically 
controlling for experimental material. 
 
(a) Main effect of severity of error
consequences (M ± 1 SE) (Study 1)












































mild                    severe
error consequences
(b) Main effect of severity of error
consequences (M ± 1 SE) (Study 1)
Figure 2.1. Main effect of severity of error consequences on affective error learning (Panel a) 
and cognitive error learning (Panel b) in Study 1. 
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In sum, the results of Study 1 are in line with our propositions concerning the role of 
severity of error consequences for learning from errors. With Study 2, we sought to replicate 
our findings in a different sample (sample from the United States), and to extend them by 
investigating the role of a second error characteristic for learning from errors: agent (i.e., the 
person who made the error). 
Study 2 
Method 
Sample. Participants were 118 working adults from the United States, recruited via 
eLancing websites6. Research has demonstrated that data gathered via eLancing websites are 
of satisfactory quality (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The quality can be 
augmented by taking certain steps, such as using attention check items and fair compensation 
of the participants (e.g., Aguinis & Lawal, 2012; Cheung, Burns, Sinclair, & Sliter, 2017). We 
carefully followed these recommendations. Mean age of our participants was 35.76 years (SD 
= 10.54) and 35 % were female. Participants' average work-experience was 14.31 years (SD = 
10.48) and 39 % reported to hold a leadership position. Participants came from different 
industries, the most frequent were Information and Communication (14.4 %), Manufacturing 
(12.7 %) and Financial and Insurance activities (12.7 %). Participants received USD 4.50 for 
participation (which corresponds to an hourly wage of approximately USD 9.00 and was thus 
in line with the United States federal minimum wage). The criteria for inclusion of respondents 
in the survey were age (>18 years), place of residence (the United States), and employment 
status (at least part-time employed). 
Experimental design and procedure. Design and procedure of Study 2 were similar 
to those of Study 1, with the following differences. First, in Study 2 we tested two experimental 
 
6 Of the 120 participants originally recruited, two participants had to be excluded from further analyses. 
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factors: severity of error consequences (mild vs. severe) and agent (self vs. other, e.g., a close 
colleague), resulting in a 2x2 within-participants design. Second, participants read not six but 
eight scenarios in which we described error situations that varied with regard to severity of 
error consequences and agent. As in Study 1, to avoid sequence, practice, and boredom effects, 
we counterbalanced the order of presentation and scenario-factor combinations (Girden, 1992). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four permutations of material versions. For later 
statistical analyses, we used material version as control variable. Third, as a filler task, we only 
used the subscale measuring numerical skills of the cognitive ability test applied in Study 1.  
Experimental material. In Study 2, we used the same six vignettes (i.e., error 
scenarios) as in Study 1 that described typical error situations at work. We additionally included 
two new vignettes. As in Study 1, the two new vignettes were pilot tested to arrive at (a) a 
scenario as realistic as possible and (b) at a distinction as clear as possible between degrees of 
the experimental factor severity of error consequences (i.e., mild or severe). As in Study 1, the 
manipulation of the experimental factor severity of error consequences was implemented by 
systematically varying the endings of error scenarios. The manipulation of the experimental 
factor agent was implemented by varying the person who made the error (self or colleague), 
for example “you made the mistake to use the wrong, out-dated project plan as a basis for 
ordering” vs. “your colleague made the mistake to use the wrong, out-dated project plan as a 
basis for ordering”. 
Measures. 
Manipulation checks. We used the same manipulation checks as in Study 1. Again, we 
found large effects both for the two questions, F(1,117) = 297.96, p < .001, hp2 = .72, and for 
the Kunin item, F(1,117) = 276.19, p < .001, hp2 = .70, indicating that our manipulations had 
worked well. 
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Dependent variables. As in Study 1, we assessed affective error learning with 3 of the 
4 items of the subscale “learning from errors” of the Error Orientation Questionnaire (EOQ; 
Rybowiak et al., 1999). Median Cronbach's alpha was .91 across experimental conditions. For 
cognitive error learning (i.e., recall of error situations), participants were asked to recall as 
many of the previously presented error scenarios in as much detail as possible. In order to 
facilitate recall, we asked for the agent who made the error, the error situation, as well as the 
error consequences. Two raters independently assigned the values 0 (incorrect), 1 (partially 
correct), or 2 (fully correct) to the recall of the error situation and to the error consequences, 
respectively. Additionally, the two raters coded whether participants correctly recalled the 
agent who made the error with 0 (incorrect) or 1 (correct), resulting in a maximum score of 5. 
Inter-rater agreement was high, with a median ICC(3,2) of .99 (range .95 to 1.00) across the 
scenarios. 
Filler task (cognitive ability test). As filler task (after presentation of error scenarios 
and before the recall of error scenarios), we used the same measure for numerical skills of the 
freely available cognitive ability test (Satow, 2017) that we also used in Study 1 (22 items; 
Cronbach's alpha = .86).  
Results 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of variables used in Study 2 are depicted 
in Table 2.2.  
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Descriptive analyses showed that our two learning measures, affective error learning 
and cognitive error learning, were correlated by r = .19 (p < .05) (note that in Study 1, we did 
not find a significant correlation between our two learning measures). This significant, but 
small correlation indicates that our two variables measure the same construct, namely learning 
from errors, but cover somewhat different aspects of the criterion space. Furthermore, as we 
expected, cognitive ability was positively related to cognitive error learning, but not related to 
affective error learning, indicating that our two dependent variables differ in the extent of 
cognitive loading. Hence, we included cognitive ability as a between-participants covariate and 
reran all analyses, but the pattern and magnitude of effects were unaltered. In the following, 
we therefore report results without this additional covariate.  
Severity of error consequences and agent. Hypothesis 1 predicted that severity of 
error consequences increases learning from errors in that learning is higher for errors with 
severe consequences. Hypothesis 2 predicted that learning from errors depends on the agent in 
that learning is higher when the error is made by oneself as opposed to when the error is made 
by someone else. The hypothesized effects were tested simultaneously in a repeated-measures 
MANOVA with the two learning measures affective error learning and cognitive error learning 
as dependent variables. We included material version (i.e., vignette-factor combination) as a 
between-participants control factor (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001).  
As we expected, the multivariate test results showed a main effect of severity of error 
consequences on learning from errors, F(2,113) = 7.88, p < .001, hp2 = .12, and a main effect 
of agent, F(2,113) = 23.07, p < .001, hp2 = .29. Thus, all two hypotheses were supported. 
Additional, post-hoc univariate analyses showed the expected main effect of severity 
of error consequences for both learning measures, for affective error learning, F(1,114) = 
10.51, p < .01, hp2 = .08, and for cognitive error learning, F(1,114) = 6.20, p < .05, hp2 = .05 
(see Figure 2.2 Panel a and b). Regarding the agent, we found the expected main effect for 
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affective error learning, F(1,114) = 44.18, p < .001, hp2 = .28 (see Figure 2.2, Panel c), but not 
for cognitive error learning, F(1,114) = 0.15, p = .70, hp2 = .00.7 
In sum, Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1 with regard to the main effect of 
severity of error consequences on learning from errors and extended them with regard to the 
main effect of agent. Not only did participants report more learning after errors with severe 
consequences (affective learning measure); they also recalled error scenarios with severe 
consequences better than error scenarios with mild consequences (cognitive learning measure). 
Participants also reported more learning if the error was made by oneself than made by a close 
colleague. However, participants did not recall error scenarios where the agent was oneself 
better than error scenarios where the agent was a close colleague.  
  
 
7 The other effects in the repeated measures MANOVA (not pertinent to the hypothesis) were as follows. For the 
first learning measure (affective error learning): no main effect of material version, F(3,114) = 1.05, p = .38, 
ηp2 = .03, no interaction effect of material version with severity of error consequences, F(3,114) = 2.15, p = 
.10, ηp2 = .05, or agent, F(3,114) = 1.13, p = .34, ηp2 = .03. For the second learning measure (cognitive error 
learning): no main effect of material version, F(3,114) = 0.21, p = .89, ηp2 = .01, but an interaction effect of 
material version with severity of error consequences, F(3,114) = 15.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, and agent, F(3,113) 
= 3.40, p < .05, ηp2 = .08.  
(a) Main effect of severity of error
consequences (M ± 1 SE) (Study 2)













































(b) Main effect of severity of error
consequences (M ± 1 SE) (Study 2)
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Figure 2.2. Main effect of severity of error consequences on affective error learning (Panel a) 
and cognitive error learning (Panel b), and main effect of agent on affective error learning 
(Panel c) in Study 2. 
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Discussion 
It is well-established that individuals can learn from errors (e.g., Frese & Keith, 2015). 
However, we know surprisingly little whether and how errors differ in the extent to which they 
foster learning. In the present research, we demonstrated in two samples that otherwise 
identical errors differ in the extent to which they stimulate learning, dependent on error 
characteristics such as severity of error consequences or the agent who made the error. More 
specifically, in two vignette experiments, we demonstrated that learning was more likely when 
(a) the consequences of the errors were severe as opposed to mild and when (b) the error was 
made by oneself as opposed to by someone else.  
Theoretical Contributions 
First, we were able to demonstrate that the amount of learning from errors that occurred 
depended on the severity of the error consequences: as predicted, more learning occurred from 
errors with severe as opposed to mild consequences. This is interesting, as the vignette 
methodology allowed us to hold the error itself and the context in which it occurred constant. 
We suggest that both on the individual and organizational level, the process that explains why 
more learning occurs from errors and incidents with severe consequences is that errors with 
severe consequences attract more attention. This is in line with Cannon and Edmondson (2005), 
who argue that errors with mild consequences are more easily overlooked or ignored, and thus 
receive less attention. It is striking that slight modifications of our vignettes (e.g., replacing 
mild with severe consequences) resulted in such strong effects, although participants responded 
to otherwise identical error scenarios with identical lessons to be learned. 
One potential alternative explanation for our result that more learning occurred from 
errors with severe consequences is that the mechanism behind the effect is not the severity but 
the noticeability of errors with severe consequences. However, this explanation would not 
contradict our argumentation: We argue that errors with severe consequences foster learning 
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because they attract more attention – they are more noticeable. In order to better understand 
which aspects of severity foster learning, future studies may systematically vary different 
aspects of severity. For example, aspects of severity may be who is affected by the error, how 
many people are affected by it, or how big the damage is that is caused by the error. 
Second, we were able to demonstrate that who made the error determined the amount 
of learning from errors that occurred: we observed more affective error learning from errors 
made by oneself as opposed to by someone else. While learning can occur from observing 
others (e.g., Bandura, 1986), we assumed that errors made by oneself are considered of higher 
personal relevance, which increases learning potential. This is in line with our results regarding 
affective error learning but not regarding cognitive error learning. We did not find differences 
in cognitive learning from errors made by oneself as opposed to by someone else. There are 
three possible explanations for our results that participants reported more affective learning 
from errors made by oneself but not did not recall more error situations with errors made by 
oneself. First, as Bandura (1986) argued, learning can occur while observing others. It is 
possible that despite reporting more learning from errors made by oneself people learn just as 
well from errors made by others. Second, it is possible that the effect of severity of error 
consequences was superior over the effect of agent. Participants thus were able to remember 
whether the error´s consequence was severe or mild but could not remember anymore who 
made the error. Personal relevance (i.e., the error was made by oneself) may be important in 
the situation when the error happens. This is in line with our result that participants reported 
more learning from errors made by oneself after reading the vignettes. Later on, however, it 
may be the consequence of the error that really matters. Third, there is a “general tendency to 
overestimate the importance of personal or dispositional factor relative to environmental 
influences” (i.e., fundamental attribution error; Ross, 1977): People tend to attribute 
dispositional factors to other people´s behavior in a given situation and underemphasize 
 Chapter 2  43 
situational factors. This may also be the case when observing others while doing an error. 
Thinking that the error was the result of the person´s fault could result in reporting less learning 
afterwards. The effect of the fundamental attribution error, however, may decrease over time 
and people still remember and learn from the error made by the other person.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research 
In the present study, we used vignette experiments to test our assumptions that severity 
of error consequences and the person who made the error influence learning from errors. 
Learning from errors is a critical topic that may be difficult to study in non-experimental field 
settings for the following reasons. First, while errors happen quite often (e.g., Frese, 1991), 
many people are reluctant to report errors. This may be because in many companies, errors are 
stigmatized so that employees might fear negative consequences when reporting errors. 
Second, in natural field settings, it is hardly possible to isolate error characteristics in a similar 
manner as we did in our study. While conducting a study in natural field settings as opposed to 
employing a vignette methodology would produce findings of high ecological validity, it would 
be difficult to clearly identify which error characteristics influenced learning – which was the 
aim of the present study. In that way, we were able to hold all error characteristics except for 
our independent variables constant. 
In regard to ecological validity, we see the prior concern of our study in the way we 
assessed learning from errors. We assessed affective error learning using three self-report items 
of the “learning from errors” subscale of the Error Orientation Questionnaire (Rybowiak et al., 
1999). As a self-report measure, responses on our affective error learning scale may be affected 
by response biases. Participants may have indicated more affective error learning than we may 
observe using a different way of assessment. In order to address this issue, we additionally 
assessed cognitive error learning in terms of recall of error situations by asking participants to 
describe the error situation and the error consequences we had previously presented to them. 
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Even though we cannot be sure that the pattern we found in our results will also be reflected in 
actual behavior, we propose that our measures are valid proxies for actual learning from errors 
for mainly four reasons. First, our affective error learning measure was a validated measure of 
learning from errors (Rybowiak et al., 1999). Second, affective learning from errors can be 
considered as a readiness and intention to learn from that particular error. Social psychological 
research demonstrates substantial correlations between intentions and behavior (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1977). Third, our findings regarding severity of error consequences are in line with 
those of previous correlational research using non-experimental field data (Homsma et al., 
2009). Fourth, in one of our studies (Study 2), we were able to demonstrate that the cognitive 
error learning variable correlated with the affective error learning variable. While we 
acknowledge that recalling error scenarios and actual learning from error are not the same, 
recalling the error and the consequences caused by the error are necessary prerequisites and 
intrinsically tied to actual learning from errors. 
The aim of our study was to systematically asses how varying the factors agent and 
severity of error consequences influences learning from errors. We chose an experimental 
setting to study variations of these factors under standardized conditions – by means of vignette 
experiments. This allowed us to identify a cause-effect relationship for affective and cognitive 
error learning. At the same time, it came at the expense of a behavioral learning measure, as it 
did not allow participants to actually demonstrate what they had learned from the errors. We 
acknowledge the importance of studying actual behavioral reactions to the errors, and strongly 
encourage future studies in this area. Future studies on learning from errors may aim at 
developing a learning measure that on the one hand allows to be employed in standardized 
settings such as experiments, but on the other hand has higher ecological validity than the 
measures we employed.  
A first step may be to replicate our vignette experiments, but additionally asking 
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participants to describe what they would have done differently if they were asked to do the 
same task again. Subsequently, two independent raters may rate participants' answers in terms 
of the extent of learning from errors. This would allow for a systematic variation of the factors 
we had investigated, while at the same time giving participants the opportunity to articulate 
what they had learned. Another possibility may be to invite participants into a laboratory to 
work on standardized tasks. For standardized tasks, the possible errors participants could make 
would be limited to a certain pool of errors. These errors may be categorized and the learning 
that results from them could be assessed. One way of assessing actual learning from these 
errors may be to see whether participants repeated the errors they had made. Another possible 
future study may be a field study in one specific department of an organization, which may be 
considered as a balance between a standardized setting, while at the same time allowing to 
observe behavioral outcomes in reaction to errors. It has to be noted, however, that not all errors 
must lead to behavioral outcomes, or that the time lag between the error and the adapted 
behavior may be too long to observe it during a field study.  
Furthermore, future studies could also explore additional error characteristics such as 
the level of action regulation (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1998; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; 
Zapf, Brodbeck, Frese, Peters, & Prümper, 1992). The action regulation theory differentiates 
three levels of action regulation: sensorimotor, routinization, and intellectual. Low-level errors 
occur while executing routinized or familiar tasks that require little or no conscious control, for 
example, forgetting to send the attachment of an e-mail. High-level errors, in contrast, occur 
when executing less routinized and less familiar tasks that require conscious control, for 
example, making a wrong decision due to inadequate knowledge. We assume that low-level 
errors lead to less learning as they are less informative than high-level errors. 
It is also important to systematically explore cross-cultural influences on learning from 
errors. Gelfand, Frese, and Salmon (2011) proposed a number of cultural dimensions that might 
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affect responses to errors and error management in organizations. For example, a low degree 
of uncertainty avoidance in a culture may lead to less intensive negative emotional reactions to 
errors.  
Practical Implications 
All the errors employed in our study, and all error characteristics evoked learning from 
errors. Consequently, one approach to increase learning from errors, particularly from errors 
with mild consequences and errors that were made by others, would be to put them in the focus 
of attention. That way, errors with mild consequences and errors made by others would be 
more noticeable. This may be of particular importance, as most errors that happen every day 
are, luckily, errors that do not end in catastrophes – their consequences are mild. In order to 
fully exploit the learning potential of errors with mild consequences, managers might suggest 
regular meetings in which particularly such errors are discussed. Discussion of errors with mild 
consequences might be more open, as fear and negative emotions should be reduced: “nothing 
happened, anyway, so why not talk about it!”, should be the prevailing attitude instead of 
“nothing happened anyway, so why bother sharing what went wrong?”. Furthermore, these 
meetings may tackle the implications of our finding that learning from errors also occurs when 
someone else has made the error – the communication lets other people know about the error, 
so the team or the organization as a whole can learn from it. “You don't need to make an error 
yourself in order to learn from it!”, could be a motto that encourages sharing the error, as one 
does something that benefits the group as a whole. 
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3 
Does Country Matter? Testing the Effect of 
Error Characteristics on Learning from Errors 
in Three Countries 
1
Abstract 
Errors can be a source of learning. However, little is known to what 
extent learning from errors depends on error characteristics and the 
context in which the error was made. We tested the assumption that 
more learning occurs from errors with severe consequences and when 
the error was made by oneself. We further investigated the role of 
organizational culture for learning from errors and if and how learning 
from errors differs between countries. In a vignette study (N = 588 from 
the United States, Hungary, and Germany), participants responded to 
error scenarios that happen to employees at work. As expected, people 
learned more from errors in terms of affective error learning if 
consequences were severe, if the error was made by themselves, and 
when more error management culture was experienced. Furthermore, 
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we found differences between countries in affective learning from 
errors in that participants from the United States learned more from 
errors than participants from Hungary or Germany. This relationship 
was mediated by error management culture. With our study, we aim to 





n the previous chapter, we demonstrated that the amount of learning from errors depends 
on (a) the severity of error consequences, and (b) the agent who made the error. As 
predicted, more learning occurred from errors with severe as opposed to mild 
consequences and when the error was made by oneself as opposed to by someone else. Our 
results were consistent in two geographically different samples: Germany and the United 
States. However, due to differences in our study designs in the two samples, we were not able 
to test whether there are country differences in learning from errors. In the present chapter, we 
seek to replicate the pattern of results from our studies in Chapter 2 and to extend them by 
assessing country differences in learning from errors by collecting data in three different 
countries, namely the United States, Hungary, and Germany. In particular, we investigate (c) 
the relationship of organizational error culture (i.e., shared norms and beliefs about errors) and 
learning from errors, and (d) whether there are country differences in error management 
culture, and (e) learning from errors. We also explore whether (f) potential country differences 
in learning from errors may be due to differences in error management culture. For this purpose, 
we study samples of three different countries, namely the United States, Hungary, and 
Germany, and assess error management culture. We selected the United States, Hungary, and 
Germany, as these countries differ in regard to the way people deal with uncertainty (House, 
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). The way people deal with uncertainty may 
influence how people consider and deal with occurring errors (i.e., error management culture), 
I 
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as errors are always, to a certain extent, ambiguous. This, in turn, may influence how much 
learning from errors occurs. 
The question of whether and how countries differ in organizational culture and learning 
from errors has important implications for both theory and practice. We aim to shed light on 
why country differences may be observed in learning from errors. From a practical perspective, 
only by understanding which error characteristics and how the cultural context determine 
learning from errors can organizations develop appropriate interventions to improve learning 
from errors. In the following section, we define relevant concepts and develop our hypotheses 
in more detail. 
Recap from the Previous Chapter: Theory and Hypotheses 
Errors and Learning from Errors 
We define errors are unintentional deviations from goals, rules, or standards (Frese & 
Keith, 2015; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Reason, Manstead, Stradling, 
Baxter, & Campbell, 1990). Errors do not inevitably lead to negative error consequences (Frese 
& Keith, 2015) and can even lead to positive consequences, such as learning.  
We define learning as “changes in the knowledge, skills, or attitudes” (Kraiger, 
Passmore, dos Santos, & Malvezzi, 2015, p. 4) and behavior (Bell, Tannenbaum, Ford, Noe, 
& Kraiger, 2017; Baldwin & Ford, 1988). How much learning from errors occurs may depend 
on the amount of attention an error receives. Different error characteristics may determine the 
amount of attention a person devotes to an error, and thus the amount of learning from errors 
that can occur. Severity of error consequences and the agent of the error are two such error 
characteristics. 
Error Characteristics that Influence Learning from Errors 
Severity of error consequences. Learning from errors may depend on the severity of 
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error consequences. We propose that severity of error consequences affects learning from 
errors positively. Errors may instigate increased attention, and that attention is a prerequisite 
for learning. As greater attention should be paid to errors with more severe consequences, more 
learning should follow. Cannon and Edmondson (2005) argue that errors with mild 
consequences are more easily overlooked or ignored, and are therefore less likely to lead to 
learning than errors with more severe consequences. This is in line with empirical evidence 
that suggests that failure, which might be considered as a negative error consequence, leads to 
more learning than success (e.g., Joung, Hesketh, & Neal, 2006; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Zakay, 
Ellis, & Shevalsky., 2004) and that more learning occurs after errors with more severe rather 
than mild or moderate consequences (Homsma, van Dyck, De Gilder, Koopman, & Elfring, 
2009). Consequently, we hypothesize that learning from errors will increase with the severity 
of error consequences. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1: Severity of error consequences increases learning from errors; the more 
severe the consequences, the more learning from errors will occur. 
Agent of the error. Who made the error can also influence learning from errors. Based 
on social learning theory (Bandura, 1986), it can be assumed that learning can occur while 
observing others, thus when someone else makes an error. In an organization, for example, an 
employee can learn from a colleague's error. However, errors made by others can also be 
overlooked easily because they might be considered irrelevant or seen as a result of the other 
person's incompetence and negligence (Frese & Keith, 2015). Furthermore, as people pay 
greater attention to personally relevant information (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981), 
learning from an error should be higher when the agent of the error is oneself. We argue that 
personal relevance attracts more attention, thus learning should be most likely if oneself makes 
an error. We propose: 
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Hypothesis 2: Learning from errors depends on the agent (i.e., the person who made the 
error): More learning from errors occurs when the error is made by oneself as opposed 
to by someone else. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Cultural Context and Learning from Errors 
Learning from errors may also be affected by cultural context. Culture consists of 
values and practices (House et al., 2004; Schein, 2004; Reichers & Schneider, 1990), which 
can vary between organizations and countries. In the following, we discuss how organizational 
culture may influence learning from errors and why we expect differences between countries 
in learning from errors. For organizational culture, we consider organizational practices 
concerning errors – i.e., an error management culture (van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 
2005). For country differences, we examine the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance 
(House et al., 2004). 
Nearly all organizations and countries regard errors as negative events. Errors thus 
evoke negative reactions such as anxiety, anger, shame, and guilt (Carmeli & Gittell, 2009; 
Edmondson, 1999; Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996; Keith & Frese, 2005, 2008; Zhao, 2011). 
Negative reactions may reduce learning. When errors are framed as indicators of failure and 
lack of competence, they set off “negative self-evaluative reaction cycles” of self-doubt and 
dissatisfaction (Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 2000, p. 267). These may have 
negative effects on learning. On the contrary, in cultures where errors are considered as chances 
to learn, i.e., an error management culture, learning should be fostered. 
Error management culture and learning from errors. Error management culture 
entails “practices related to communicating about errors, to sharing error knowledge, to helping 
in error situations, and to quickly detecting and handling errors” (van Dyck et al., 2005, p. 
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1229). Error management culture influences whether and how much learning from errors 
occurs (Keith & Frese, 2011). When the error management culture is high, it is acknowledged 
that despite best efforts to prevent errors, it is impossible to be completely error free (Reason, 
1997). The acknowledgement that errors can happen at all times, and to everyone, leads to a 
culture in which the occurrence of errors is not a taboo that has to be avoided at all cost – error 
strain will be low. Consequently, when the error management culture is high, negative 
emotions are kept at bay (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005). The positive framing 
of errors may help learners to accept errors. Accepting the occurrence of errors can help 
controlling negative emotions in response to errors (Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 
2003), which benefits learning (van Dyck et al., 2005). A mind-set of acceptance of errors may 
even increase motivation to learn, as mastery and task interest may be strengthened (Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008). We thus predict: 
Hypothesis 3: Error management culture is associated with learning from errors, in that 
learning is higher if more error management culture is experienced. 
Country differences in learning from errors. Learning from errors may differ from 
one country to another. Both theoretical (e.g., Gelfand, Frese, & Salmon, 2011) and empirical 
evidence (e.g., Davis, Bryant, Tedrow, Liu, Selgrade, & Downey, 2005; Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998) suggest that the way people deal with errors varies across countries. Learning from errors 
may thus differ as well. In the following, we take a closer look at how country differences can 
be described. 
Country differences can be described using cultural dimensions (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; 
House et al., 2004). We deem the GLOBE (House et al., 2004) dimension of uncertainty 
avoidance to be particularly important for the way people deal with errors, i.e., error 
management culture, consequently for learning from errors. 
Uncertainty avoidance refers to “the extent to which ambiguous situations are 
 Chapter 3  58 
threatening to individuals, to which rules and order are preferred, and to which uncertainty is 
tolerated in society” (de Luque & Javidan, 2004, p. 602). In other words, uncertainty avoidance 
denotes “the extent to which members of collectives seek orderliness, consistency, structure, 
and formalized procedures, and laws to cover situations in their daily lives” (de Luque & 
Javidan, 2004, p. 603). For the purpose of our study, we use the GLOBE societal practices 
scores, because we are interested in actual practices that are typical for a country, rather than 
in people's attitudes (values) on how things should be in their respective country.1 
The context, such as the location, time or physical environment, in which an 
organization operates has an impact on organizational behavior, thus on organizational culture 
(Johns, 2006). Country practices may shape work processes in organizations, as well as the 
way people in organizations interpret and deal with occurring phenomena (Noort, Reader, 
Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2016), such as errors. This is in line with the empirical evidence, for 
example, of GLOBE that suggest societal practices of uncertainty avoidance to affect 
organizational practices of uncertainty avoidance (de Luque & Javidan, 2004). Noort and 
colleagues (2016) also found the cultural dimension uncertainty avoidance to be associated 
with organizational culture, in particular with organizational safety climate (Noort et al., 2016). 
We believe that uncertainty avoidance may be particularly important for error 
management culture, and consequently for learning from errors. Errors and their consequences 
are, to a certain extent, ambiguous. An error is ambiguous for the following three reasons. First, 
the error may not be immediately detected. Second, once the error is detected, there can be 
ambiguity regarding causes of the error: several actions may have caused the error. Third, there 
 
1 It should be noted that uncertainty avoidance in the GLOBE project and by Hofstede capture different constructs 
(de Luque & Javidan, 2004; Venaik & Brewer, 2010). According to Venaik and Brewer (2010), uncertainty 
avoidance by GLOBE is unidimensional and captures the importance of orderliness, consistency, structure, as 
well as rules and laws. On the contrary, uncertainty avoidance by Hofstede is multifaceted and captures three 
different aspects: feelings of nervousness and tension, employment stability, and rule orientation. Furthermore, 
Hofstede's conceptualization of uncertainty avoidance entails mainly values. We follow Gelfand et al. (2011) 
and adhere to the unidimensional conceptualization of practices of uncertainty avoidance by GLOBE. 
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is ambiguity in the solution to the error: several reactions to an error may eliminate the problem 
or prevent its re-occurrence. The way people approach ambiguity, as circumscribed by 
uncertainty avoidance, may thus have particular influence on the way errors are considered and 
dealt with. How errors are considered and dealt with are essential aspects of error management 
culture, and are therefore important for learning from errors. We thus argue uncertainty 
avoidance may particularly influence error management culture, and consequently learning 
from errors.  
In countries high in uncertainty avoidance, errors may be evaluated more negatively 
(Gelfand et al., 2011). A negative evaluation of errors may, in turn, make error management 
culture and learning less likely. For the present study, we chose three countries that score very 
differently on the societal practices in uncertainty avoidance in the GLOBE project: while 
Hungary is low on uncertainty avoidance (M = 3.12; rank 60 of 62), the United States range in 
the middle (M = 4.15; rank 30), and Germany scores high (M = 5.22; rank 5; de Luque & 
Javidan, 2004). Following the argument that error management culture and learning from errors 
is higher in countries low on uncertainty avoidance, we would predict error management 
culture and learning from errors to be highest in Hungary, followed by the United States, and 
lastly Germany. 
There is ongoing debate about whether country rankings can be used to predict 
individual behavior (e.g., Bond, 2002; Brewer & Venaik, 2012, 2014; Kirkman, Lowe, & 
Gibson, 2006). On the one hand, Brewer and Venaik (2012) argue that phenomena that are 
observable on a societal level “do not exist on individual level” (p. 674). Rather, country 
rankings should only be used to investigate relationships with other country level variables, 
such as a country's Gross Domestic Product. On the other hand, the perception of practices in 
a country may shape socialization patterns (Maccoby, 2000), personality (Triandis & Suh, 
2002), and behavior (Adler & Gundersen, 2008; Singelis & Brown, 1995). We acknowledge 
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both sides of the debate, and therefore exercise caution in regard to how country rankings of 
any cultural dimension would predict individual learning from errors. We thus decided to put 
forth open research questions regarding country differences in favor of concrete hypotheses: 
Open research question 1: Are there country differences in learning from errors? 
Open research question 2: Are there country differences in error management culture? 
Open research question 3: If there are country differences in learning from errors (Open 
research question 1), does error management culture mediate the relationship between 
country and learning from errors? 
Overview of the Present Study 
This study differs from our studies in Chapter 2 in three regards: First, Chapter 2 
provided evidence that the affective error learning measure is an adequate proxy for learning 
from errors. Second, the present study was conducted in three different countries that score 
differently on the GLOBE uncertainty avoidance societal practices dimension, namely the 
United States, Hungary, and Germany. Third, in Study 2 in Chapter 2, we had only 
distinguished the experimental factor agent between “self” and “other”. However, according 
to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 2004), there is a “tendency to favor the in-group over 
the out-group in evaluations and behavior” (p. 281). This would imply that the degree of 
learning that occurs might not only depend on the dichotomy (self and other) but may vary 
gradually with the agent. As a result of in-group favoritism, learning might be higher from 
errors made by an in-group member (e.g., close colleague), than from errors made by an out-
group member (e.g., distant colleague). To test this assumption, the present study, thus, further 
subdivides the experimental factor agent.  
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Method 
Sample 
Participants were 588 working adults from the United States, Hungary, and Germany, 
recruited via eLancing websites. Mean age was 37.02 years (SD = 10.76) and 50 % were 
female. Participants' average work-experience was 15.11 years (SD = 11.02) and 10.7 % 
reported to hold a leadership position. Participants came from different industries, the most 
frequent were Information and Communication (13.6 %), Human Health and Social work 
activities (11.4 %), and Education (9.7 %). Participants received USD 2.40 (or its equivalent 
in Hungarian Forint or Euro) for participation (which corresponds to an hourly wage of approx. 
USD 9.00 and is thus above the minimum wage in all three countries). The criteria for inclusion 
of respondents in the survey were age (>18 years), place of residence (the United States, 
Hungary or Germany), and employment status (at least part-time employed).  
Experimental Design and Procedure 
Design and procedure of the present study were similar to those of the studies from 
Chapter 2, with the following differences. First, we included the country in which the sample 
was collected in as a between-participants factor. Second, the present study only employs the 
affective error learning measure. Third, the present study used three levels of the experimental 
factor agent (self, close colleague [i.e., from the same company], and distant colleague [i.e., 
from a different company]). As stated above, the degree of learning that occurs might not only 
depend on whether the error was made by oneself or someone else but may vary gradually with 
closeness of the agent, that is, whether the error was made by a close or a distant colleague. 
This resulted in a 3x(2x3) mixed factorial design with country as between-participants factor 
(the United States, Hungary, or Germany), and severity of error consequences (mild vs. severe) 
and agent (self vs. close colleague vs. distant colleague) as within-participants factors. 
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Experimental Material 
We used vignettes (i.e., six error scenarios) similar to those used in Chapter 2 that 
described typical errors at work. 
Measures 
Manipulation checks. To test whether participants perceived the severity of the error 
consequences in the intended way we used the same two questions as in the studies in Chapter 
2. As expected, we found a large effect, F(1,582) = 1117.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .66, indicating that 
our manipulations of severity of error consequences had worked as intended. 
Dependent variable. Affective error learning was assessed with the same three items 
as in the studies in Chapter 2, adapted from the subscale “learning from errors” of the Error 
Orientation Questionnaire (EOQ; Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999). Cronbach's alpha 
was .95. 
Error management culture. We assessed error management culture using the 17-item 
Error Management Culture Questionnaire (van Dyck et al., 2005). The Error Management 
Culture Questionnaire (van Dyck et al., 2005) is based on the Error Orientation Questionnaire 
(Rybowiak et al., 1999) and is commonly used as a measure of error management culture in 
organizations (Frese & Keith, 2015). The Error Management Culture Questionnaire entails 
aspects of error competence, learning from errors, analyzing errors, and error communication. 
Sample items are “When people make an error, they can ask others for advice on how to 
continue” or “After an error, people think through how to correct it”. Participants had to 
indicate on a 5-point Likert scale how much the statements apply to their workplace. 
Cronbach's alpha was .93. 
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Results 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of variables used in the present study are 
presented in Table 3.1. Results indicated that error management culture was positively related 
to affective error learning. Error management culture was also related to country. 
  










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Chapter 3  65 
Severity of Error Consequences, Agent, and Error Management Culture 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that severity of error consequences increases learning from 
errors in that learning is higher for errors with severe consequences. Hypothesis 2 predicted 
that learning from errors depends on the agent in that learning is higher when the error was 
made by oneself as opposed to by someone else. Hypothesis 3 predicted that error management 
culture is associated with learning from errors in that learning is higher if more error 
management culture is experienced. We tested the hypothesized effects simultaneously in a 
repeated measures ANCOVA in which we included material version (i.e., vignette-factor 
combination) as between-participants control factor (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001). Error 
management culture was mean-centered and included as a between-participants covariate 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). In support of our hypotheses, we found a main effect 
of severity of error consequences on affective error learning, F(1,581) = 27.49, p < .001, ηp2 
=.05 (see Figure 3.1, Panel a), and a main effect of agent, F(2,1162) = 71.65, p < .001, ηp2 =.11 
(see Figure 3.1, Panel b).2,3 Learning from errors was higher if the error was made by oneself 
(M = 4.23, SD = 0.03) than made by a close colleague (M = 3.93, SD = 0.03), t(587) = 9.67, p 
< .001, d = 0.38, or distant colleague (M = 3.92, SD = 0.03), t(587) = 10.52, p < .001, d = 0.39. 
Learning from errors did not differ for errors made by a close colleague or distant colleague, 
t(587) = 0.56, p = .57, d = 0.01. Furthermore, error management culture was significantly 
associated with affective error learning, F(1,581) = 96.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. 
Country Differences in Learning from Errors 
Our first open research question addressed whether there are country differences in 
 
2 Due to the violation of the sphericity assumption in case of agent, a Huynh-Feldt corrected F-value (as the ε 
estimates of sphericity were greater than 0.75) was applied (Girden, 1992). 
3 The other effects in the ANCOVA (not pertinent to the hypothesis) were as follows. No main effect of material 
version, F(5,581) = 0.66, p = .66, ηp2 = .01, but an interaction effect of material version with severity of error 
consequences, F(5,581) = 12.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, and with agent, F(10,1162) = 4.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .03. 
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learning from errors. We tested our first open research question in a repeated measures 
ANOVA in which we included a multicategorical independent variable for country (the United 
States vs. Hungary vs. Germany) and the material version (i.e., vignette-factor combination) as 
between-participants control factor (Judd et al., 2001). We found a significant relationship 
between country and affective error learning, F(2,570) = 9.00, p < .001, ηp2 =.03, indicating 
that learning differs between the United States, Hungary, and Germany (see Figure 3.1, Panel 
c). However, contrary to our assumption, learning from errors was significantly higher in the 
United States (M = 4.23, SD = 0.64) than in Hungary (M = 3.97, SD = 0.76), t(399) = 3.94, p 
< .001, d = 0.37, and also than in Germany (M = 4.00, SD = 0.57), t(386) = 3.31, p < .01, d = 
0.38. Hungary and Germany did not differ significantly, t(385) = 0.56, p = .57, d = 0.04. 
The other results in the repeated measures ANOVA (not pertinent to the hypothesis) 
were as follows. No interaction of country and severity, F(2,570) = 2.09, p = .13, ηp2 =.01, and 
no interaction of country and agent, F(4,1140) = 2.16, p = .07, ηp2 =.01.4  
 
 
4 Due to the violation of the sphericity assumption in case of agent, a Huynh-Feldt corrected F-value (as the ε 
estimates of sphericity were greater than 0.75) was applied (Girden, 1992). 
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Figure 3.1. Main effect of severity of error consequences and agent on learning from errors, 
and country differences in learning from errors. 
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Country Differences in Error Management Culture 
Our second open research question asked whether there are differences in error 
management culture between countries. To test our second open research question, we 
conducted a univariate ANOVA. We found a significant main effect of country on error 
management culture, F(2,585) = 28.37, p < .001, ηp2 =.09. Participants in the United States (M 
= 4.27, SD = 0.56) reported significantly more error management culture, than did participants 
in Germany (M = 3.91, SD = 0.57), t(386) = 6.21, p < .001, d = 0.63, or Hungary (M = 3.81, 
SD = 0.76), t(399) = 6.84, p < .001, d = 0.69. Hungary and Germany did not differ significantly, 
t(385) = 1.41, p = .16, d = 0.15.5 
Potential Mediation of Error Management Culture 
Our third open research question asked whether error management culture mediates the 
relationship between country and learning from errors. To test this open research question, we 
conducted mediation analysis (using 5000 bootstrap samples) with our multicategorical 
independent variable, country, as predictor (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes & Preacher, 
2014), error management culture as mediator, and learning from errors (affective error 
learning) as criterion variable. Based on our previous results that learning from errors and error 
management culture is highest in the United States, and that Hungary and Germany did not 
differ in error management culture and learning, we only created one dummy variable (“United 
States vs. Hungary and Germany”) for the multicategorical independent variable, country, with 
codes of (⅔, -⅓, -⅓) for the United States, Hungary, and Germany, respectively. (We reran the 
mediation analysis with two Helmert-coded dummy variables with codes of [⅔, -⅓, -⅓] and 
[0, -½ , ½] for the United States, Hungary, and Germany, respectively. The pattern and 
magnitude of results remained unaltered.) Again, we controlled for material version (i.e., 
 
5 In Chapter 2, we found the same pattern of results for country differences in error management culture. 
Participants from the United States (M = 4.22, SD = 0.52) reported significantly more error management 
culture than did participants from Germany (M = 3.81, SD = 0.50), t(237) = 6.25, p < .001, d = 0.80. 
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vignette-factor combination). We found a significant positive relationship between our dummy 
variable “United States vs. Hungary and Germany” and error management culture (Figure 3.2, 
path a). We also found a significant positive relationship between error management culture 
and affective error learning (Figure 3.2, path b). The 95 % bias corrected confidence interval 
for the indirect effect excluded zero, indicating a significant indirect relationship for our 
dummy variable “United States vs. Hungary and Germany”, b = 0.15, CI [0.09, 0.20] (see 
Figure 3.2). In other words, the results are consistent with the idea that error management 
culture mediates the relationship between country and learning from errors. 
 
Discussion 
 In the present research, we demonstrated that learning from errors not only depends on 
error characteristics such as severity of error consequences or the agent who made the error, 
but also on the cultural context in which the error occurred. More specifically, in a vignette 
experiment, we were able to replicate the results from our studies in Chapter 2, namely, that 
learning was more likely when (a) the consequences of the errors were severe as opposed to 
mild, when (b) the error was made by oneself as opposed to by someone else. Who the other 
person was did not matter: We found no difference in learning from errors made by close and 
distant colleagues. Furthermore, we found that more learning from errors occurred (c) when 
error management culture was high. We also demonstrated that participants in the United States 
Figure 3.2. The relationship between country and learning from errors mediated by error 
management culture. Unstandardized values and confidence intervals (CI). The dashed arrow 
indicates the non-significant direct path from country to learning from errors. *** p < .001. 
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(d) report more error management culture, and (e) learned more from errors than participants 
in Hungary or Germany. Further, we showed that (f) the differences in learning from errors 
were due to differences in error management culture. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Our results regarding severity of error consequences and agent are in line with the 
results found in Chapter 2. As these results were discussed in detail in Chapter 2, here, we only 
discuss the result regarding error characteristics that we did not find differences in learning 
from errors made by in- and outgroup members. One potential explanation for this result is that 
we used vignette-methodology with hypothetical error situations. Participants might not be 
able to clearly identify with their in-group in a hypothetical error situation. This could indeed 
reduce in-group favoritism. Another explanation might be that the in-group member making 
an error is seen as failure. In-group favoritism might indeed depend on whether the group-
outcome is success or failure. For example, Ryen and Kahn (1975), as well as Brewer (1979) 
found that in-group favoritism disappeared when the in-group received the feedback that their 
group did not succeed. This would explain our result that learning did not differ between errors 
made by in-group and out-group members.  
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to assess how error 
management culture and learning from errors differs between countries. In order to do so, we 
selected three countries that differ in regard to the practices of uncertainty avoidance (House 
et al., 2004): the United States, Hungary, and Germany. Although we had put forth open 
research questions regarding the country differences in error management culture and learning 
from errors, we had assumed that amongst others, uncertainty avoidance may have particular 
influence on how people deal with errors (i.e., error management culture), thus learning from 
errors (Gelfand et al., 2011). Specifically, we had assumed a linear effect of uncertainty 
avoidance on error management culture and learning from errors, predicting learning from 
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errors to be highest in Hungary, to be moderate in United States, and to be lowest in Germany. 
However, we found an inverted u-shaped relationship: error management culture and learning 
was highest in the United States (which, according to the GLOBE project, scores moderately 
on practices of uncertainty avoidance; de Luque & Javidan, 2004), and lower in Hungary (low 
in practices of uncertainty avoidance), and Germany (high on practices of uncertainty 
avoidance; de Luque & Javidan, 2004). An explanation for these results may be that in 
countries low in uncertainty avoidance, errors may not be taken seriously enough, which 
inhibits their learning potential. However, when uncertainty avoidance is high, errors may be 
considered to be too threatening. This may lead to defensive reactions, which may also reduce 
the learning potential of the errors. The optimum would thus lie in the middle, at moderate 
levels of practices of uncertainty avoidance. 
However, it could be that another cultural dimension, namely humane orientation 
influences how people deal with and learn from errors. Humane orientation refers to the extent 
to which a society “encourages and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, 
generous, caring, and kind to others” (House & Javidan, 2004, p. 13). Humane orientation may 
influence error management culture and learning from errors, because it “is related to increased 
compassion and acceptance and thus acceptance of mistakes” (Gelfand et al., 2011, p. 260). 
Countries high on humane orientation can thus be described as more error tolerant. In the 
GLOBE study, one item examines how error tolerant people are in the respective country. This 
item on error tolerance is part of the humane orientation scale (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004). 
When errors are more tolerated and expected to happen, emotions associated with errors should 
be less negative (Frese & Keith, 2015). This may foster an environment in that learning from 
error may be more likely. According to the GLOBE study, Germany (M = 3.18; rank 61 of 62) 
and Hungary (M = 3.35; rank 58) are lower on humane orientation practices than the United 
States (M = 4.17; rank 26; Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004). Following the reasoning that error 
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management culture and learning from errors is higher in countries high on humane orientation, 
error management culture and learning from errors should be highest in the United States, 
followed by Hungary and Germany. This corresponds to the pattern of results that we found in 
our study. We argue that humane orientation fosters learning from errors because humane 
orientation may be associated with error tolerance. This may seem like a contradiction to our 
hypothesis that errors need to be severe enough to stimulate learning. We believe that this 
seeming contradiction can be reconciled: Error tolerance means that it is accepted that errors 
may happen despite efforts to prevent them. This positivity may stem from the assumption that 
errors can be corrected. Error tolerance does not mean that errors are not taken seriously. We 
argue that errors need to be taken seriously to evoke learning. This is in line with our 
argumentation that more learning from errors occurs when error consequences are severe rather 
than mild, because errors with severe consequences are taken more seriously. However, it has 
to be noted that the concept of humane orientation as defined by GLOBE is subject of debates. 
For example, Schlösser and colleagues (2013) point out that humane orientation is an 
ambivalent, multidimensional construct. The GLOBE humane orientation scale as such has 
rather poor psychometric properties and validation evidence. 
Another alternative explanation for our results regarding country differences in learning 
from errors may lie in the litigious nature of the United States. The United States are considered 
to be a more litigious country than Germany or Hungary. In litigious countries, seemingly small 
incidents can develop severe consequences, such as a tort case with the threat of high 
compensation payments. When each error may develop severe consequences, each error may 
be taken seriously. Thus, we would assume more learning from errors to occur in the United 
States than in Germany or Hungary. This may explain why participants in our United States 
sample learned most of errors, regardless of the manipulated severity of the consequences.  
Further, we had assumed that country differences in learning from errors are due to 
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differences in error management culture. We identified error management culture as mediator 
in the relationship between country and learning from errors.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research 
Using country rankings as predictors for individual behavior has been criticized for long 
(e.g., Brewer & Venaik, 2012, 2014; Bond, 2002). According to Brewer and Venaik (2012), 
societal level phenomena “do not exist on individual level” (p. 674). In a similar manner, 
Schwartz argues that “cultural value orientations are properties of societies, not of individuals” 
(2009, p. 146). Furthermore, Minkov and Hofstede argue that dimensions of national culture 
“are meaningless as descriptors of individuals or as predictors of individual differences because 
the variables that define them do not correlate meaningfully across individuals” (2011, p. 12). 
The assumption that similar characteristics and relationships exist at the cultural and individual 
level has been labeled ecological fallacy (e.g., Brewer & Venaik, 2012, 2014; House & Hanges, 
2004). Brewer and Venaik (2012) further argue that one may not associate societal level 
phenomena, such as practices of uncertainty avoidance, with phenomena on an individual level, 
such as individual behavior. Instead, one may only investigate relationships of societal level 
phenomena with societal level variables, such as the Gross Domestic Product. In that sense, 
GLOBE's uncertainty avoidance practices scores are not a measure or predictive of individual 
behavior, but represent how participants perceive the practices in the society. 
However, several researchers argue that there may well be an influence of country level 
variables on individual behavior. For example, how practices in a country are perceived can 
influence socialization patterns (Maccoby, 2000), personality (Triandis & Suh, 2002), and 
behavior (Adler & Gundersen, 2008; Singelis & Brown, 1995). This may be because the 
perceptions of what is prevailing, what is considered to be right or wrong, may shape “the 
knowledge about and attitudes towards life” (Geertz, 1973, p. 89), and the norm of how people 
feel one expects them to behave.  
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We acknowledge the caveats as noted above (e.g., Brewer & Venaik 2012, 2014). 
However, we also acknowledge the line of reasoning that perception of the practices in a 
country may influence individual behavior. It has to be noted that of course, not every 
individual in a country must behave accordingly, but we believe that the practice scores of a 
cultural dimension may adequately pinpoint to a general behavioral tendency of individuals in 
the respective country. De Mooij (2013) argues that “scores on national dimensions cannot be 
used to predict the behavior of a particular individual, but as long as authors are clear about 
reporting frequencies or averages, using the word individuals is not problematic. (…) 
Individuals in a national society are like the pieces in a jigsaw puzzle; while each being unique, 
they fit together and produce a meaningful national picture. In describing the national culture, 
it is perfectly okay to refer to characteristics of individuals that in such a culture are relatively 
more frequent or more likely”. Taken together, we had decided to exercise caution regarding 
potential country differences in learning from errors and had put forth open research questions 
in favor of concrete hypotheses.  
Another limitation of our study is that we cannot be sure whether people actually 
learn(ed) more from errors in the United States or whether our results are due to a response 
bias, the acquiescence bias. 
Another potential limitation is that we collected data on error management culture and 
learning from errors from the same persons. Due to the common source bias, the results might 
be inflated. We therefore encourage further studies that use data from different sources in order 
to further assess the relationship between error management culture and learning from errors. 
Also, error management culture was assessed on the individual level even though error 
management culture is a concept on the organizational level. Future studies may assess 
responses regarding error management culture of more than one person from an organization 
and analyze data on the aggregated organizational level. 
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One of the strengths of our study is that we tested our assumptions in more than one 
country. Our results, namely, that learning form errors differs between countries, demonstrate 
the importance of cross-cultural research on learning from errors. Another strength of our study 
is our design, as we applied experimental vignette methodology using carefully developed and 
pretested error scenarios. We included manipulation checks and statistically controlled for 
experimental material. Furthermore, we had a large sample size of 588 participants from three 
different countries. 
In the ongoing replication crisis in psychology and other fields (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015), replication of results is important to minimize the possibility of false 
positive findings. In this regard, one of the strengths of the present paper is that we were able 
to find the suggested pattern across three independent samples from three countries. 
Practical Implications 
Our study demonstrated that learning from errors differs significantly depending on 
characteristics that lie within the error itself (e.g., severity of its consequences) as well as on 
factors lying outside the error (e.g., agent who makes the error). We also found that learning 
from errors differs between countries and that more learning occurs when more error 
management culture is experienced. Apparently, not the error per se and its informational value 
determines whether people use it for learning. Rather, superficial characteristics of the error 
situation (such as the person who made the error) determine whether people are willing to 
devote more attention to the error and subsequently learn from it.  
Our results suggest that errors with mild consequences and errors made by someone 
else do not receive as much attention as errors with severe consequences or errors made by 
oneself. The learning potential inherent in errors, thus, is not fully exploited. In order to foster 
learning from errors for employees, organizations should develop interventions that actively 
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encourage learning from errors and raise attention even to errors with mild consequences. 
Furthermore, organizations should foster an error management culture in their teams – a culture 
in which errors may be openly discussed and are considered as positive events. A non-threating 
atmosphere could foster an open discussion about errors and turn attention to errors that would 
have otherwise been overlooked because they were not severe or visible enough to catch 
attention. Moreover, by fostering an open discussion about errors between colleagues, one is 
able to learn about and from errors made by someone else. While developing interventions 
regarding errors, organizations should also take into account country specific characteristics, 
norms, and habits. Our insights can be used to develop interventions to improve the way people 
deal with errors in organizations, as well as to raise attention to the importance of country 
specific issues.  
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4 
How To Induce an Error Management 




Field studies have shown that error management culture benefits 
organizational performance. However, the question whether and how 
an error management culture can be induced remained unanswered. We 
conducted an experiment with newly formed teams (N = 180 
participants (60 triads)), in which we aimed to induce an error 
management culture. Furthermore, we sought to replicate the pattern of 
results concerning error management culture and performance found in 
field studies. We attempted to induce an error management culture in 
two ways. First, we used an error management culture manipulation 
based on error management training instructions that encourages 
exploration and learning from errors. Second, we used an error 
management culture manipulation based on normative social influence. 
Additionally, we used an error prevention culture manipulation as a 
 
The research presented in this dissertation was supervised and supported by Nina Keith and Michael Frese. 
Parts of this chapter will be presented at the 35th Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology in Austin, TX. 
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control condition. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental conditions: error prevention culture manipulation, error 
management culture manipulation based on error management training 
instructions, or error management culture manipulation based on 
normative social influence. Participants had to work together in teams 
on creative problem-solving tasks. We were able to experimentally 
replicate the beneficial effect of error management culture on 
performance found in field studies in a creative problem-solving task. 
Furthermore, we successfully influenced groups' perception of error 
management culture with manipulations based on error training 
instructions. The error management culture manipulation based on 
error training instructions led to higher perception of error management 
culture in teams, and thus to higher performance. However, the effects 
persisted over time only when culture strength (i.e., the agreement 
about culture between group members) was high. By studying error 
management culture in standardized laboratory settings, we aim to 
contribute to the theoretical understanding of the effect of error 
management culture. For practitioners, we aim to provide insights into 




n the previous two chapters, we demonstrated that the amount of learning from errors 
depends on (a) different error characteristics, such as the severity of error consequences 
or the agent who made the error, as well as on (b) contextual factors, such as the 
perceived organizational culture (e.g., error management culture) or country. In our studies, 
more learning occurred from errors with severe as opposed to mild consequences and when the 
error was made by oneself as opposed to by someone else. We also found learning from errors 
to be highest in the United States, followed by Germany and Hungary. Moreover, we found 
that more learning from errors occurred when more error management culture was experienced. 
In this chapter, we shift the focus from the individual to the team level, and examine whether 
I 
 Chapter 4  85 
the beneficial effect of error management culture on learning from errors can also be extended 
to performance-related outcomes. 
Error management denotes a “useful approach to errors with the goal of reducing future 
errors, of avoiding negative error consequences and of dealing quickly with error consequences 
once they occur” (Frese, 1995, p. 113). Error management culture applies the principles of 
error management to the team or organizational level. An error management culture has been 
shown to positively predict performance in terms of innovativeness (e.g., Fischer, Frese, 
Mertins, & Hardt-Gawron, 2018), profitability, goal achievement, survivability (e.g., van 
Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005), and safety (e.g., Hofmann & Mark, 2006). However, 
previous studies on error management culture have mainly two aspects in common: (a) they 
studied the effects of error management culture on the aggregated, organizational level instead 
of the more fine-grained team level, and (b) they are field studies. While field studies have the 
advantage of high ecological validity, external influences can hardly be excluded. We believe 
that this may be problematic, as many factors may play an important role and influence 
organizational performance, for example the management's leadership, the industry in which 
the company operates, as well as other cultural factors that go above and beyond the error 
management culture.  
Another shortcoming of these field studies is that they neglected the question of how 
an error management culture can be induced in teams, so that team members commonly adopt 
positive views on errors. This question is particularly important, as in most if not all 
organizations, team and organizational members fluctuate over time: Teams may exist and 
remain unchanged for years, or team members may join and leave frequently. Understanding 
how an error management culture may be induced does not only contribute to our theoretical 
knowledge, but is also relevant for practitioners in order to understand drivers of change. We 
thus believe it is highly relevant to study error management culture in an experimental setting, 
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thereby allowing standardization and exclusion of confounding variables rather than 
statistically controlling for them.  
The aim of the present studies is thus twofold: First, we aim to induce an error 
management culture in teams. By grouping strangers into teams, we have the opportunity to 
attempt to experimentally induce an error management culture. Second, we further seek to 
replicate the beneficial effects of error management culture on performance reported in field 
studies in an experimental setting. 
Our research shall contribute to the existing literature in the following ways. First, from 
a theoretical perspective, by studying how an error management culture can be induced, we 
aim to shed light on questions regarding the drivers of change and innovation effects. Second, 
from practitioner perspective, the question of how to induce an error management culture is 
highly important. Third, from an empirical perspective, we believe that we are the first ones to 
experimentally induce error management culture and to investigate the beneficial effects of 
error management culture on performance. Experimental studies on error management have 
been conducted on the individual level (e.g., Chillarege, Nordstrom, & Williams, 2003; 
Dormann & Frese, 1994; Frese, Brodbeck, Heinbokel, Mooser, Schleiffenbaum, & Thiemann, 
1991; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003; Keith, 2011; Keith & Frese, 2005; for a 
meta-analysis, see Keith & Frese, 2008) and do not shed light on questions that are culture-
specific.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Error Management Culture 
Most (if not all) organizations make errors. Because every organization is confronted 
with the possibility that errors may happen, organizations implicitly or explicitly adopt some 
shared norms, practices, and procedures of dealing with errors. These shared assumptions, 
values, practices, and norms constitute an organizational culture (Reichers & Schneider, 1990; 
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Schein, 2004) – i.e., error management culture1. Error management culture applies the 
principles and practices of error management to the team or organizational level. Error 
management is a perspective towards errors that disentangles errors from their consequences. 
The aim is not to avoid an error per se, but to avoid negative consequences that may result from 
unmanaged errors. Above and beyond that, error management aims to foster positive 
consequences that may result from errors, such as learning and innovation (e.g., Sitkin, 1992, 
Keith & Frese, 2011, Fischer et al., 2018).  
Error Management Culture and Performance 
We posit that error management culture positively relates to performance in teams. 
Common practices and principles of error management culture, such as the open 
communication about errors, knowledge-sharing, quick error detection, coordinated error 
handling, and thus quick damage control help to decrease negative error consequences and 
increase positive error consequences such as learning from errors or secondary error prevention 
(van Dyck et al., 2005). When error management culture is high, team members accept errors 
and expect them to happen, are more vigilant, and anticipate errors better. In turn, quick error 
detection allows to minimize negative error consequences (Keith & Frese, 2011). Furthermore, 
when error management culture is high, team members do not fear blame and punishment for 
errors and are encouraged to manage errors and learn from them (van Dyck et al., 2005; Frese 
& Keith, 2015). Team members are thus more willing to experiment or explore (van Dyck et 
al., 2005; Dormann & Frese, 1994; Keith & Frese, 2008). Exploration and experimentation, in 
turn, foster innovativeness (Fischer et al., 2017).  
This is in line with empirical evidence that suggests error management culture to be 
beneficial for organizational outcomes such as safety, innovativeness, and performance in 
 
1While it can be argued that this description is more applicable to a climate than a culture (e.g., Denison, 1996; 
Reichers & Schneider, 1990), we stick to the term error management culture that has been introduced by 
van Dyck et al. (2005). 
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terms of firm profitability (e.g., Fischer et al., 2018; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Keith & Frese, 
2011; van Dyck et al., 2005). However, the questions remain whether the beneficial effects of 
error management culture on performance reported in field studies can also be observed under 
standardized conditions and exclusion of confounding variables. In sum, both theory and 
empirical evidence suggest error management culture to benefit performance. We hypothesize:  
Conceptual Hypothesis: Error management culture positively predicts team 
performance (Figure 4.1). 
We operationalize our conceptual hypothesis by attempting to induce an error 
management culture. Research agrees that error management culture beneficially influences 
performance related outcomes (van Dyck et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 2018, Hofmann & Mark, 
2006). However, despite these positive findings, research is scarce whether and if so, how an 
error management culture in teams or organizations can be established. To at least partially 
answer this question, we have to take a closer look on the etiology of organizational cultures.  
The Creation and Change of Organizational Culture 
There are three approaches to the etiology of organizational culture2: the structural, the 
perceptual, and the interactive approach3 (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Moran & Volkwein, 
1992). According to the structural approach (Payne & Pugh, 1976), people's shared values, 
norms, and assumptions arise as an exposure to the organization's characteristics and structure. 
There are two main problems with the structural approach. First, several studies found 
subcultures within an organization (e.g., Sackmann, 1992). Based on the argumentation of the 
 
2 These approaches are originally described as the approaches to the etiology of climate. However, we use the 
terms culture and climate interchangeably, due to our definition and understanding of the error management 
culture concept (see Footnote 1). 
3 Moran and Volkwein (1992) introduced a fourth approach, the cultural approach. The cultural approach can be 
seen as an extension of the interactive approach that counts for the broader context in which the group 
members interact and respond to the situation. Under broader context, the authors refer to organizational 
culture and explicitly differentiate culture and climate. 
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structural approach, there should only be one perception of culture within an organization. 
Second, the results concerning the relationship of organizational structure elements and culture 
is inconsistent (Berger & Cummings, 1975, Cummings & Berger, 1976).  
The perceptual approach (see also, perceptual measurement-individual attribute 
approach (James & Jones, 1974) and selection-attraction-attrition or attraction-selection-
attrition approach (SAA or ASA, Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Schneider, 1987)) argues that 
the culture is formed while individuals interpret and respond psychologically meaningfully to 
situational variables (Moran & Volkwein, 1992). The main limitation of this approach is that 
it puts the source of the assumptions, meaning, and beliefs within the individual (Schneider & 
Reichers, 1983).  
The interactive approach “blends the objectivism and subjectivism of these [previously 
described] approaches” (Ashforth, 1985, p. 837). Culture is formed while group members 
interact with each other and respond to their situation, which results in shared meaning, 
assumptions, and values (Moran & Volwein, 1992). Both informational and normative social 
influence are key processes while group members interact (Ashforth, 1985). The interactive 
approach is in line with Schein's (1983) and our understanding that organizational culture 
emerges in two ways. First, a culture emerges while an organization invents, discovers or 
develops basic assumptions while “learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation 
and internal integration – a pattern of assumptions that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think, feel, and behave in relation to those problems” (Schein, 1983, p. 14). Second, a culture 
emerges when founders formulate ideologies, norms, strategies and “influence followers to 
adopt them” (Trice & Beyer, 1993, p. 414). It is, thus, “possible to influence the kinds of 
perceptions that individuals have” (Schneider & Reichers, 1983, p. 36) by top-management 
with the use of adequate skills and resources (Alvesson & Svenningson, 2008). In sum, culture 
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arises from three sources: 1) the founder's (or leader's or manager's) beliefs, values, and 
assumptions; (2) the learning experiences of group members while confronted with various 
problems; and (3) new values of new members (Schein, 2004).  
If organizational culture emerges as a result of the founder's influence or develops over 
time while group members interact, that implies that culture is changeable. Sathe and Davidson 
(2000) reviewed the cultural change literature and concluded that changing (at least some) 
values and beliefs is indeed possible. However, there is disagreement between authors whether 
change of deep beliefs and values is achievable, or if only a superficial change (the compliance 
of members) can be achieved (Sathe & Davidson, 2000). According to Sathe and Davidson 
(2000), cultural change can be seen as the process of what Lewin (1951) proposed as 
“unfreezing, moving, and freezing of group standards” (p. 228). The biggest question in the 
process is “whether behaviors or minds are the best targets for change” (Sathe and Davidson, 
2000, p. 282), thus whether (and when) intrinsic or extrinsic forms of reinforcement should be 
used. Sathe and Davidson (2000) argue that both intrinsic motivators (that effect behavior 
change) and extrinsic motivators (that effect change in values and beliefs) should be used in 
the change process. While there is no panacea for successful emergence and change processes, 
it is evident that culture can be formed and changed.  
Inducing an Error Management Culture 
While it is evident that (organizational) culture can be established and changed, the 
question of how an (organizational) culture regarding errors (i.e., error management culture) 
can be induced remains unanswered. To answer this question, we conducted an experimental 
study in which we tried to induce an error management culture covering different aspects of 
the principles and practices of error management culture. For this purpose, we developed two 
different error management culture manipulations. 
First, we developed a manipulation based on normative social influence. The interactive 
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approach to the etiology of culture considers normative social influence as a key factor in the 
formation of organizational culture (Ashforth, 1985). Normative social influence can be 
defined as “an influence to conform with the positive expectations of another” (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955, p. 629). Several studies demonstrated the power of normative social influence 
on people's behavior (e.g., Sherif, 1935; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Asch, 1955, 1956; Cialdini, 
Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Schultz, 1999; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 
2007; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008; Milgram, Bickman, & 
Berkowitz, 1969; for a review see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Moreover, studies 
demonstrated that a direct observation of others is not a requirement for normative social 
influence to take effect on people's behavior (e.g., Schultz, 1999; Parks, Sanna, & Berel, 2001; 
Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). “Communicating a descriptive norm – how most 
people behave in a given situation – via written information can induce conformity to the 
communicated behavior” (Nolan et al., 2008, p. 913). For example, in a study from Goldstein 
and colleagues (2008), hotel guests received written messages about participation in a towel 
reuse program: “Join your fellow guests in helping to save the environment. Almost 75% of 
guests who are asked to participate in our new resource savings program do help by using their 
towels more than once. You can join your fellow guests in this program to help save the 
environment by reusing your towels during your stay.” (p. 474). The appeal employing written 
descriptive norms resulted in a higher towel reuse rate.  
Second, we developed a manipulation based on error management training instructions. 
Error management training “is an active learning approach that emphasizes experimentation 
and exploration by participants rather than a tight structure and the guidance of participants” 
(Frese & Keith, 2015, p. 672). Error management training has been shown to be more effective 
than alternative training methods which do not encourage learning (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 
2008; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Carter & Beier, 2010; Keith & Frese, 2005; for a meta-analysis 
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see Keith & Frese, 2008). In error management training, participants are only provided with 
minimal guidance and structure. This way, error management training fosters exploration of 
the task by enhancing the informative feedback of errors (Keith & Frese, 2005). Error 
management training acknowledges the positive and informative function of errors during 
training (Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996; Keith & Frese, 2008). Moreover, trainees are 
explicitly encouraged to make errors, appreciate the informative functions of errors, and to 
learn from errors: “You have made an error? Great! Because now you can learn something 
new!” (Keith & Frese, 2008, p. 60). Error management training, however, focuses on the 
individual level. In our study, we aimed at inducing error management culture by using error 
management training instructions but applying them to the team level. We thus hypothesize: 
Operational Hypotheses: An error management culture manipulation fosters error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) and thus performance (Figure 4.1).4 
Operational Hypothesis a: An error management culture manipulation based on 
normative social influence fosters error management culture (as perceived by the team) 
and thus performance. 
Operational Hypothesis b: An error management culture manipulation based on error 
management training instructions fosters error management culture (as perceived by the 
team) and thus performance. 
 
4 In order to avoid potential confusions with our experimental manipulation, we refer to our measure of error 
management culture as error management culture (as perceived by the team). 
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Literature suggests that culture persists over time (e.g., Schein, 1983; Ehrhart, 
Schneider, & Macey, 2014; Kotter & Hesketh, 1992). This is in line with the assumption that 
norms form quickly and are stable over time (Sherif, 1936). An indicator, thus, of whether we 
actually succeeded in inducing an error management culture would be that the effect of our 
manipulations on error management culture (as perceived by the team) and thus performance 
persists over time. We thus put forth an open research question: 
Open research question: Does the effect of error management culture manipulations on 




Participants were 180 students (N = 60 triads) of a German university. Mean age was 
25.76 years (SD = 10.12) and 41.1 % were female. Most of the participants (68.9 %) worked 
at least part-time. Participants received either EUR 8 (approx. USD 9.50) or partial course 
credit as compensation. 
Figure 4.1. Conceptual and operational hypothesis. 
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Experimental Design and Procedure 
We invited participants to our laboratory to work on a team tasks that requires creative 
problem solving, namely the “Marshmallow Challenge” and a marble run task.  
The Marshmallow Challenge is commonly used at team-building workshops and 
trainings (Wujec, 2010) but also for experimental purposes (e.g., Cook & Olson, 2006; Steele, 
Hardy, Day, Watts, & Mumford, 2019). In the Marshmallow challenge, participants' task was 
to use spaghetti to build a structure, and to place a marshmallow on top. The challenge was to 
build the highest standing structure. The group who builds the highest structure would win an 
additional prize in form of a voucher for an online retailer5. The marble run task is a 
construction task similar to the “rolling ball” task used in previous experiments from Tschan 
(1995, 2002). In the marble run task, participants had to build a ball track system that is a “roller 
coaster structure for marbles” (Tschan, 1995, p. 376). The challenge was to build the highest 
functioning marble run, to use as many pieces as possible to build the marble run, and to create 
a route in which the marble runs as long as possible. Again, the best performing group would 
win an additional prize in form of a voucher for an online retailer. 
We chose these tasks for the following five reasons. First, in these tasks team 
performance can be measured meaningfully and objectively. Second, these tasks do not require 
previous knowledge and are simple enough to be learned within a one-time laboratory session. 
Third, the tasks entail certain degrees of freedom with regard to how to arrive at a solution (i.e., 
a task that involves one single-best solution that needs to be found by the team would not be 
suitable). Fourth, in these tasks, participants can clearly see and know when they made an error 
(i.e., the structure in the Marshmallow Challenge collapses). The tasks deliver immediate 
feedback if an error has happened. Fifth, the tasks require a minimum of coordination and 
 
5In line with ethical standards and to avoid disadvantages for participants of any experimental condition, we in 
fact rewarded the best performing group in each condition. 
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communication among team members so that it makes sense for the team members to 
communicate about errors (i.e., tasks that can be completely subdivided and worked on 
individually without further team coordination would not be suitable).  
After arrival in our experimental laboratory, we briefly welcomed our participants and 
asked them to individually complete questionnaires regarding demographics and their attitudes 
about errors. Then, we grouped individual participants from the same session into teams of 
three and randomly assigned the teams to one of three experimental conditions (between-
participants design with one experimental factor, error framing condition): (1) Error 
management culture manipulation based on normative social influence, (2) Error management 
culture manipulation based on error management training instructions, or (3) Error prevention 
culture manipulation. Our manipulations focused on how participants should deal with errors 
in the process of the team task. We used two error management culture manipulations, in which 
we covered different aspects of the principles of error management culture.  
In the Error management culture manipulation based on normative social influence 
(EMC-social influence), we informed participants about the beneficial effects of errors. Similar 
to the study by Goldstein and colleagues (2008), in our study, people received error 
management culture principles and practices as written descriptive norms. In particular, we 
told participants that the most successful groups in previous rounds of task execution were 
those that “made the most trials and also made the most errors! 90% of the most successful 
groups openly discussed errors. That way it was possible to learn from errors as a team and to 
improve further. This does not only apply to the [task used in this study]. Studies have shown 
that companies that see errors as a learning opportunity are much more successful.” (extraction; 
for the manipulations used in this study see Appendix B). 
In the Error management culture manipulation based on error management training 
instructions (EMC-error exploration), we explicitly encouraged participants to explore the 
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task, make errors, and learn from them as a group: “Test again and again whether the structure 
[participants had to build as part of task execution] is already stable enough (…). If the structure 
[collapses] - be happy because you made an error, and from your errors you can learn! Discuss 
in your group what went wrong. Be open about dealing with errors. This is the only way to 
learn from your errors. You can try around for 10 minutes - you even get [new constructions 
parts] every time! Thus, you can try out a variety of constructs. The more you try around, the 
more errors you will make - and the more errors you make, the better you can get!” (Note that 
all the groups had the chance to try again and were provided with new construction parts when 
the structure collapsed. This was clearly stated in the instructions. However, participants who 
received the error management culture manipulation based on error training instructions were 
explicitly encouraged to try around.) 
In the Error prevention culture manipulation (EPC), participants were instructed to 
avoid errors while working on the team task, as they hinder them at work and because dealing 
with errors costs time and energy. 
After receiving the manipulations and the instructions, participants were asked to 
discuss what they have read about errors and write down the most important points on a 
flipchart. By encouraging participants to discuss what they have read about errors and asking 
them to formulate action principles (e.g., Glaub, Frese, Fischer, & Hoppe, 2014), we aimed to 
foster internalization of our manipulations (Gal’perin, 1967). Participants then had 10 minutes 
to work on the first team task, the Marshmallow Challenge. Subsequently, participants 
individually had to complete questionnaires regarding how they perceived the work 
environment in the team. Afterwards, participants had to work on the second team task, the 
marble run task, for 10 minutes. Subsequently, participants individually had to complete 
questionnaires regarding how they perceived the work environment in the team during the 
second team task. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed and compensated. 
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Measures 
Manipulation check.  
To assess whether our manipulations worked in the intended way, we counted the 
number of trials participants made until they arrived at their final solution in Task 1 and Task 
2. The number of trials can be seen as errors made in the process, thus we expected teams in 
the error framing conditions “EMC-social influence” and “EMC-error exploration” to dare to 
make more errors than teams in the “EPC” condition. In line with our assumption, error framing 
condition (i.e., the manipulation participants received) had a significant main effect on the 
number of trials in the first task, F(2,57) = 4.52, p < .05, ηp2 = .14. Participants who received 
the EPC manipulation tried significantly less times than participants who received the EMC-
social influence manipulation, t(57) = -2.80, p < .01, d = 0.88 or participants who received the 
EMC-error exploration manipulation, t(57) = -2.36, p < .05, d = 0.75. There was no difference 
between teams in the two EMC conditions, t(57) = 0.47, p = .64, d = 0.15. For the second task, 
we did not find differences in the number of trials between error framing conditions, F(2,57) = 
1.72, p = .19, ηp2 = .06. 
Dependent variables. 
Team performance. As a measure of team performance in the first team task 
(Marshmallow Challenge), we measured the height of the spaghetti-structure (in cm) with the 
marshmallow on top. A requirement for measurement was that the structure does not collapse 
for 30 seconds. As a second measure, we coded whether the structure collapsed in 30 seconds 
or not (0 for collapsed, 1 for did not collapse). If the structure collapsed, team performance 
(i.e., the height of the structure) was rated with zero. As measures of team performance in the 
second team task (marble run task), we measured the height of the marble run (in cm), the 
number of pieces that were used to build the marble run, and how long the marble runs (in sec).  
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Error management culture (as perceived by the team). We assessed error management 
culture (as perceived by the team) with the 17-item Error Management Culture Questionnaire 
(van Dyck et al., 2005) with slight modifications of item wordings to fit the team context. A 
sample item is “After making a mistake, people in this team tried to analyze what had caused 
it”. The Error Management Culture Questionnaire (van Dyck et al., 2005) is commonly used 
as a measure in organizations (Frese & Keith, 2015). It entails aspects of error competence, 
learning from errors, analyzing errors, and error communication. Participants responded on a 
5-point Likert scale. Cronbach's alpha was .89 for the first time of measurement (error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) during the Marshmallow Challenge) and α = 
.87 for the second time of measurement (error management culture (as perceived by the team) 
during the marble run task). 
Individual responses were aggregated at the team level. To justify aggregation, we 
computed within-team agreement for each team using rwg(j) (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984, 
1993), and reliability of responses among team members with intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICC; Bliese, 2000). For the first time of measurement, the mean values of rwg(j) = .83, ICC(1) 
= .27 and ICC(2) = .52 (F(59,120) = 2.11, p < .001) suggested appropriate levels of within-
team agreement and reliability (LeBreton & Senter, 2008), justifying aggregation. For the 
second time of measurement, the mean values of rwg(j) = .92, ICC(1) = .18 and ICC(2) = .39 
(F(59,120) = 1.65, p < .05) suggested appropriate levels of within-team agreement and 
reliability (LeBreton & Senter, 2008), justifying aggregation.  
Control variables. 
Error orientation. We included error orientation (measured before the manipulation) 
as control variable, because the success of our manipulations may depend on the participants' 
error orientation prior to taking part in our study. We assessed Error Orientation with the 37-
item Error Orientation Questionnaire (Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999). A sample 
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item is “Errors help me to improve my work”. Cronbach's alpha was .82. 
Task familiarity. We included task familiarity as control variable, because performance 
in the “Marshmallow Challenge” task and in the marble run task may depend on how familiar 
participants are with similar tasks. We assessed task familiarity with the following two 
questions6: “Were you familiar with the “Marshmallow Challenge/marble run” task?”; “Have 
you worked on the “Marshmallow Challenge/marble run task” task before?” Cronbach's Alpha 
was .87 for the first task, and .79 for the second task. 
Familiarity with team members. We assessed if participants were familiar with their 
team members by asking “How well do you know the two other members of your group?”. 
Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely.  
Results 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of study variables are depicted in Table 
4.1 and 4.2.  
 
6 We additionally assessed a third question “How familiar are you with tasks such as the Marshmallow 
Challenge/marble run task?” Due to poor reliability, this item was deleted from the scale. 
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Preliminary Analyses 
To test whether participants' error orientation, task familiarity (with the first or second 
task), and familiarity with team members differed between conditions, we conducted univariate 
ANOVAs. Participants' error orientation (F(2,57) = 1.04, p = .36, ηp2 = .04), task familiarity 
with the Marshmallow Challenge (F(2,57) = 1.59, p = .21, ηp2 = .05), task familiarity with the 
marble run task (F(2,54) = 0.30, p = .74, ηp2 = .01), and familiarity with team members (F(2,57) 
= 0.96, p = .39, ηp2 = .03) did not differ between conditions. Thus, control variables were 
excluded from further analyses. 
Hypotheses Testing 
Conceptual hypothesis. 
Our conceptual hypothesis assumed that error management culture predicts team 
performance. To test this hypothesis, we conducted linear regression analysis with error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) as predictor variable and our first team 
performance measure in the Marshmallow Challenge, namely the height of the structure, as 
criterion variable. The results of the linear regression analysis indicated that error management 
culture (as perceived by the team) explained a significant proportion of variance in team 
performance scores, R2 = .34, F(1,58) = 29.51, p < .001. Furthermore, error management 
culture (as perceived by the team) significantly predicted team performance, b = 24.74, (β = 
.58), t(58) = 5.43, p < .001.  
To test our conceptual hypothesis for our second team performance measure in the 
Marshmallow Challenge, namely whether the structure collapsed or not, we conducted logistic 
regression analysis. The results of the logistic regression analysis indicated that error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) explained a significant proportion of variance 
in team performance scores, R2 = .39, χ2(1) = 20.60, p < .001. Furthermore, error management 
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culture (as perceived by the team) significantly predicted team performance, b = 3.09 (SE = 
.086), p < .001, Odds Ratio = 22.04. 
Operational hypothesis. 
Our operational hypothesis assumed that an error management culture manipulation 
(Ha: based on normative social influence, and Hb: based on error management training 
instructions) fosters error management culture (as perceived by the team), and thus 
performance. To test this hypothesis, we first conducted a univariate ANOVA. We found a 
significant main effect of error framing condition on error management culture (as perceived 
by the team), F(1,57) = 6.04, p < .01, ηp2 = .18 (see Figure 4.2, Panel a). 
Planned pairwise-comparisons revealed that teams manipulated with EMC-error 
exploration perceived significantly higher levels of error management culture than teams that 
received an EPC manipulation, t(38) = 3.67, p < .01, d = 0.86. Teams manipulated with EMC-
social influence did not perceive significantly higher levels of error management culture than 
teams that received an EPC manipulation, t(38) = 1.86, p = .07, d = 0.59. We found no 
difference in teams' perception of error management culture between EMC conditions, t(38) = 
1.56, p = .13, d = 0.49. In sum we were able to induce error management culture (as perceived 
by the team) in teams with an error management culture manipulation. However, only the 
EMC-error exploration manipulation affected teams' perception of error management culture, 
but not the EMC-social influence manipulation.  
Additionally, we tested whether team performance differed between error framing 
conditions (i.e., experimental manipulations). We conducted a univariate ANOVA with error 
framing condition as predictor and our first measure of team performance in the Marshmallow 
challenge, the height of the structure as criterion variable. We did not find a significant main 
effect of error framing condition on team performance, F(2,57) = 3.06, p = .05, ηp2 = .10. 
However, planned pairwise comparisons revealed that teams manipulated with an EMC-error 
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exploration manipulation had significantly higher performance scores than teams that received 
an EPC manipulation, t(38) = 2.46, p < .05, d = 0.78. Teams manipulated with EMC-social 
influence did not have significantly higher performance scores than teams that received an EPC 
manipulation, t(38) = 1.09, p = .28, d = 0.35. We found no difference in teams' performance 
between teams manipulated with EMC manipulations, t(38) = 1.36, p = .18, d = 0.43 (see Figure 
4.2, Panel b).  
For our second team performance measure in the Marshmallow Challenge, namely 
whether the structure collapsed or not, we conducted logistic regression analysis. Due to the 
multicategorical nature of our predictor variable error framing condition, we created two 
dummy variables with indicator coding and the error prevention culture manipulation as 
reference category: D1 with codes of (0, 1, (0)) and D2 with codes of (0, (0), 1) for EPC 
manipulation, for EMC-error exploration, and EMC-social influence, respectively. We found 
that D1 (EMC-error exploration vs. EPC) significantly predicted team performance, b = 1.50 
(SE = 0.69), p < .05, Odds Ratio = 4.50; R2 = .11, χ2(2) = 5.17, p = .07. D2 (EMC-social 
influence vs. EPC) did not predict team performance, b = 0.61 (SE = 0.64), p = .34, Odds Ratio 
= 1.83 (see Figure 4.2, Panel c).  
In sum, we found evidence that teams manipulated with an error management culture 
manipulation had higher team performance in Task 1 (Marshmallow Challenge: higher 
structures and less structure-collapses) than teams manipulated with error prevention culture 
manipulations. However, only teams that received the EMC-error exploration manipulation 
had higher team performance, but not teams that received the EMC-social influence 
manipulation.   
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(b) Differences in team performance (Task 1) 
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EPC           EMC 1        EMC 2
Experimental manipulation
(a) Differences in error management culture
(as perceived by the team) (Task 1) between
experimental manipulation groups (M ± 1 SE)
Figure 4.2. Differences in error management culture (as perceived by the team) and team 
performance (Task 1) between experimental manipulation groups (M ± 1 SE). EPC = Error 
prevention culture manipulation; EMC 1 = Error management culture manipulation based on 
normative social influence; EMC 2 = Error management culture manipulation based on error 
management training instructions. 
 
Figure 4.3. The significant indirect effect of dummy variable D1 for our manipulation (i.e., 
error prevention culture manipulation (coded 0) vs. error management culture manipulation 
based on error training instructions exploration (coded 1)), and the non-significant indirect 
effect of dummy variable D2 for our manipulation (i.e., error prevention culture (coded 0) 
vs. error management culture manipulation based on normative social influence (coded 1)) 
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Second, we conducted mediation analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes & Preacher, 
2014) with error framing condition (i.e., error management culture manipulation based on error 
training instructions, error management culture manipulation based on normative social 
influence, and error prevention culture manipulation) as predictor variable, error management 
culture (as perceived by the team) as mediator variable, and team performance in the first team 
task (height of the structure or did the structure collapse or not) as criterion variable. We used 
5,000 bootstrap samples and estimated 95 % bootstrap confidence intervals (CI). If the CI does 
not include zero, mediation is supported. For our multicategorical predictor variable (i.e., error 
framing condition), we used the same dummy variables as in previous analysis. We found the 
significant indirect effect for our dummy variable “EMC-error exploration vs. EPC” (D1) b = 
12.02, CI [4.76, 21.05], but not for our dummy variable “EMC-social influence vs. EPC” (D2), 
b = 6.14, CI [-0.43, 14.67] (see Figure 4.3). 
Furthermore, we found support for the indirect effect of error framing condition on team 
performance for our second team performance measure in the Marshmallow Challenge (did the 
structure collapse or not) through error management culture (as perceived by the team) for our 
dummy variable “EMC-error exploration vs. EPC” (D1) b = 1.57, CI [0.60, 3.55], but not for 
our dummy variable “EMC-social influence vs EPC” (D2), b = 0.80, CI [-0.08, 1.38] (see 
Figure 4.4). In sum, error management culture (as perceived by the team) mediates the 
relationship between error framing condition (i.e., the manipulation the teams received) and 
team performance.   
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Figure 4.3. The significant indirect effect of dummy variable D1 for our manipulation (i.e., 
error prevention culture manipulation (coded 0) vs. error management culture manipulation 
based on error training instructions exploration (coded 1)), and the non-significant indirect 
effect of dummy variable D2 for our manipulation (i.e., error prevention culture (coded 0) vs. 
error management culture manipulation based on normative social influence (coded 1)) on 
team performance (first indicator) in Task 1 through error management culture (as perceived 
by the team). Team Performance: Height of the structure in cm. Higher values indicate better 
performance. The dashed arrows indicate the direct paths between the dummy variables for 
our manipulation (D1, and D2) and team performance. Unstandardized values and confidence 
intervals (CI). N = 180 participants (60 teams). † p < .10, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 4.4. The significant indirect effect of dummy variable D1 for our manipulation (i.e., 
error prevention culture manipulation (coded 0) vs. error management culture manipulation 
based on error training instructions exploration (coded 1)), and the non-significant indirect 
effect of dummy variable D2 for our manipulation (i.e., error prevention culture (coded 0) vs. 
error management culture manipulation based on normative social influence (coded 1)) on 
team performance (second indicator) in Task 1 through error management culture (as 
perceived by the team). Team Performance: did the structure collapse (0) or not (1). The 
dashed arrows indicate the direct paths between the dummy variables for our manipulation 
(D1, and D2) and team performance. Unstandardized values and confidence intervals (CI).  
N = 180 participants (60 teams). † p < .10, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Open Research Question Testing 
Our open research question asked whether the effects of error management culture 
manipulations on error management culture (as perceived by the team) and thus on team 
performance persist over time. We tested our open research question first using a univariate 
ANOVA with error framing condition (error management culture manipulation based on error 
training instructions, error management culture manipulation based on normative social 
influence, and error prevention culture manipulation) as predictor variable and error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) during the second task (marble run task) as 
criterion variable. Teams' perception of error management culture during the second team task 
did not differ between error framing conditions (i.e., which manipulation the teams received), 
F(2,57) = 1.72, p = .19, ηp2 = .06.  
Second, we conducted multivariate regression analysis to test the relationship of error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) and team performance in the second task. We 
found no relationship between error management culture (as perceived by the team) and team 
performance in the second task (indicators: height of the marble run, the number of pieces that 
were used to build the marble run, and running time of the marble), F(3,56) = 1.19, p = .32, hp2 
= .06. Post-hoc univariate test-results are depicted in Table 4.3. 
Furthermore, we conducted a multivariate ANOVA with error framing condition 
(EMC-error exploration, EMC-social influence, and EPC manipulation) as predictor variable 
and team performance in the second team task (indicators: height of the marble run, the number 
of pieces that were used to build the marble run, and running time of the marble) as criterion 
variable. The multivariate test results did not show a main effect of error framing condition on 
team performance in the second team task, F(6,112) = 0.95, p = .46, hp2 = .05.  
As we did not find an effect of error framing condition (i.e., experimental manipulation) 
neither on error management culture (as perceived by the team), nor on team performance, we 
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did not proceed with mediation analysis. In sum, the effects of an error management culture 
manipulation on error management culture (as perceived by the team) and thus team 
performance did not persist over time.  
Additional Exploratory Analyses 
One potential explanation for our results that our manipulations of error management 
culture only resulted in higher error management culture perceptions and team performance in 
the first but not in the second task is that we did not actually succeed in establishing a culture. 
It may be that our results in the first task are only indicators of participants' superficial 
compliance with the instructions. (In our Discussion section, we discuss further alternative 
explanations for these results.) Schneider, Salvaggio, and Subirats (2002) suggest “that the 
continuity over time of a climate or a culture will be a function of the strength of climate or 
culture” (p. 227). The authors conceptualize climate or culture strength as the degree of within-
group agreement about climate or culture (Schneider et al., 2002; Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 
2013). They propose that “in weak climate conditions, regardless of the level of the climate 
perceptions, predictions of behavior would be less reliable than when the climate is strong” 
(Schneider et al., 2002, p. 221). Following this argumentation, it may be possible that the reason 
we did not find results for our second task is because some groups had weaker culture or climate 
strength. Thus, culture or climate strength shall moderate the relationship of error management 
culture (as perceived by the team) and team performance in the second task (Schneider et al., 
2002, p. 221; Gonzáles-Romá, Peiró, & Tordera, 2002). That is, in groups with high culture or 
Table 4.3 
Univariate Test Results of the Multivariate Regression Analysis     
Criterion variable Predictor b SE(b) β t p ηp2 
Height of the structure1 Error management culture4 -3.67 2.83 -0.17 -1.30 .20 .03         
Number of construction pieces2 Error management culture 0.30 3.86 0.01 0.08 .94 .00         
Running time of marble3 Error management culture 2.44 1.59 0.20 1.54 .13 .04 
Notes. N = 180 participants (60 teams). 
1R2 = .03; 2R2 = .00; 3R2 = .04; 4 as perceived by the team. 
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climate strength, error management culture (as perceived by the team) should predict team 
performance.  
To test this assumption, we conducted multivariate multiple regression analysis with 
culture or climate strength (Task 2) as moderator, error management culture (as perceived by 
the team) as predictor, and team performance in the second task as criterion variable 
(indicators: height of the marble run, the number of pieces that were used to build the marble 
run, and running time of the marble). We operationalized culture or climate strength using rwg(j) 
(James et al.,1984, 1993). Culture or climate strength was mean-centered and included as a 
between-participants covariate (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). We did not find a main 
effect of culture or climate strength, F(3,54) = 0.27, p = .85, hp2 = .01., nor an interaction effect 
of error management culture (as perceived by the team) and culture or climate strength on team 
performance in the second task, F(3,54) = 0.22, p = .88, hp2 = .01.7 Results of additional post-
hoc univariate analyses are depicted in Table 4.4.  
  
 
7 We also tested the assumed moderator role of culture or climate strength for our first task using multiple linear 
regression and multiple logistic regression analyses. Culture or climate strength did not predict team 
performance, b = 56.88, (β = .75) t(58) = 0.51, p = .61, nor did we find an interaction effect of error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) and culture or climate strength on the first indicator (height of 
the structure) of team performance in Task 1, b = -21.00, (β = -.93), t(58) = -0.62, p = .54; Model: R2 = .36, 
F(3,56) = 10.72, p < .001). Furthermore, culture or climate strength did not predict the second indicator (did 
the tower collapse) of team performance, b = 25.66 (SE = 27.15), p = .35, Odds Ratio = 1.39, nor did we find 
an interaction effect of error management culture (as perceived by the team) and culture or climate strength 
on team performance, b = -8.38 (SE = 8.46), p = .32, Odds Ratio = 0.00; Model: R2 = .43 χ2(1) = 23.50, p < 
.001. 
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We additionally reran all analyses for the open research question without the groups 
that had low within-group agreement. One option researchers  mention when both low and high 
levels of agreement groups are within a single data set is to eliminate low-agreement groups 
(LeBreton & Senter, 2008; Biemann, Cole, & Voelpel, 2012; Burke, Cohen, Doveh, & Smith-
Crowe, 2018; e.g., Susskind, Kacmar, & Borchgrevink, 2003; Aryee, Chen, & Budhwar, 2004; 
Riordan, Vandenberg, & Richardson, 2005). Nevertheless, LeBreton and Senter (2008) and 
Biemann and colleagues (2012) warn about deleting low-agreement groups prior to hypothesis 
testing “because losing valuable data points is never ideal [and] statistical power will be 
reduced” (Biemann et al., 2012; p. 74). However, Biemann and colleagues (2012) also suggest 
that conducting analyses with and without low-agreement groups is a viable option. We 
followed this recommendation and reran analyses for the second team task without low-
agreement groups (e.g., Shaw, Zhu, Duffy, Scott, Shih, & Susanto, 2011). We eliminated 
groups based on rwg(j)-values (James et al.,1984, 1993) and the standard deviation of 
Table 4.4 
Univariate Test Results of the Multivariate Multiple Regression Analysis  
Criterion variable Predictor b SE(b) β t p ηp2 
Height of the structure1 Error management culture4 -3.43 3.39 -0.16 -1.01 .32 .02 
 Culture/climate strength -25.30 46.02 -0.58 -0.55 .58 .01 
 
Error management culture 
X Culture/climate strength 7.21 13.70 0.06 0.53 .60 .00 
 
 
      
Number of construction pieces2 Error management culture -5.30 4.43 -0.18 -1.20 .24 .02 
 Culture/climate strength 7.56 60.12 0.13 0.13 .90 .00 
 
Error management culture 
X Culture/climate strength 4.05 17.90 0.23 0.23 .82 .00 
 
 
      
Running time of marble3 Error management culture 1.88 1.90 0.15 0.99 .33 .02 
 Culture/climate strength -12.74 25.76 -0.51 -0.49 .62 .00 
  
Error management culture 
X Culture/climate strength 4.39 7.67 0.60 0.57 .57 .01 
Notes. N = 180 participants (60 teams). 
1R2 = .03; 2R2 = .09; 3R2 = .05; 4 as perceived by the team 
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participants' perceptions of error management culture (Schneider et al., 2002). We eliminated 
two groups that had low rwg(j)-values and also high standard deviations. Afterwards, we reran 
all analyses for our open research question8.  
First, we reran the univariate ANOVA with error framing condition (i.e., which 
manipulation the teams received) as predictor variable and error management culture (as 
perceived by the team) during the second task (marble run task) as criterion variable.  We did 
not find a main effect of error framing condition (i.e., which manipulation the teams received) 
on error management culture (as perceived by the team), F(2,55) = 3.15, p = .05, ηp2 = .10 
(Figure 4.5).  
However, planned pairwise-comparisons revealed that teams manipulated with EMC-
error exploration perceived significantly higher levels of error management culture than teams 
that received an EPC manipulation, t(36) = 2.74, p < .01, d = 0.89. Teams manipulated with 
EMC-social influence did not perceive higher levels of error management culture than teams 
that received an EPC manipulation, t(37) = 1.37, p = .18, d = 0.44. We found no difference in 
teams' perception of error management culture between EMC conditions, t(37) = 1.09, p = .28, 
d = 0.35. In sum, we found the same pattern of results as for the first team task: teams' 
perception of error management culture was highest when they received an error management 
culture manipulation based on error training instructions. 
Additionally, we conducted a multivariate ANOVA with error framing condition 
(EMC-error exploration, EMC-social influence, and EPC manipulation) as predictor variable 
and team performance in the second team task (indicators: height of the marble run, the number 
of pieces that were used to build the marble run, and running time of the marble). The 
multivariate test results did not show a main effect of error framing condition on team 
 
8 For Task 1 we repeated this procedure. We eliminated three groups that had low rwg(j)-values and also high 
standard deviations. We reran all analyses. The effect of the dummy variable for error framing condition D1 
(EMC-error exploration vs. EPC) changed from b = 1.50 (SE = 0.69), p < .05, Odds Ratio = 4.50 to b = 1.32 
(SE = 0.70), p = .06, Odds Ratio = 3.75.Other results remained unaltered. 
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performance in the second team task, F(6,108) = 0.89, p = .51, hp2 = .05.  
Second, we reran the multivariate regression analysis to test the relationship of error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) and team performance in the second task. We 
found no relationship between error management culture (as perceived by the team) and team 
performance in the second task (indicators: height of the marble run, the number of pieces that 
were used to build the marble run, and running time of the marble), F(3,54) = 074, p = .53, hp2 
= .04. Post-hoc univariate test-results are depicted in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 
Univariate Test Results of the Multivariate Regression Analysis after Eliminating two Teams  
Criterion variable Predictor b SE(b) β t p ηp2 
Height of the structure1 Error management culture4 -2.97 3.24 -0.12 -0.92 .36 .01 
        
Number of construction pieces2 Error management culture -3.67 4.24 -0.12 -0.86 .39 .01 
        
Running time of marble3 Error management culture 1.77 1.82 0.13 0.97 .33 .02 
Notes. N = 174 participants (58 teams). 



























EPC           EMC 1        EMC 2
Experimental manipulation
Figure 4.5. Differences in error management culture (as perceived by the team) (Task 2) 
between experimental manipulation groups (M ± 1 SE). EPC = Error prevention culture 
manipulation; EMC 1 = Error management culture manipulation based on normative social 
influence; EMC 2 = Error management culture manipulation based on error management 
training instructions. 
 
Table 4.6Figure 4.5. Differences in error management culture (as perceived by the team) 
(Task 2) between experimental manipulation groups (M ± 1 SE). EPC = Error prevention 
culture manipulation; EMC 1 = Error management culture manipulation based on 
normative social influence; EMC 2 = Error management culture manipulation based on 
error management training instructions. 
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Third, we conducted the same multivariate multiple regression analysis with 
culture/climate strength as moderator, error management culture (as perceived by the team) as 
predictor, and team performance (in the second team task) as criterion variable. We found a 
main effect of culture or climate strength, F(3,52) = 4.43, p < .01, hp2 = .20, and an interaction 
effect of error management culture (as perceived by the team) and culture or climate strength 
on team performance in the second task, F(3,52) = 4.09, p < .05, hp2 = .19. Results of additional 
post-hoc univariate analyses are depicted in Table 4.6. We found the expected interaction effect 
of error management culture (as perceived by the team) and culture or climate strength only 
for one indicator of team performance in the second team task, the running time of the marble 
(Figure 4.6).  
Additionally, we conducted moderated mediation analysis with PROCESS (Model 14; 
Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes & Preacher, 2014), with error framing condition as predictor, 
team performance in Task 2 (only the indicator running time of marble) as criterion variable, 
error management culture (as perceived by the team) as mediator, and culture or climate 
strength as moderator of the relationship error management culture (as perceived by the team) 
and team performance in Task 2. The index of the moderated mediation was not significant, 
D1: Index = 25.00, CI [-10.63, 59.75]; D2: Index = 13.32, CI [-9.07, 46.54]. 
In sum, the results imply that the effects of an error management culture manipulation 
on error management culture (as perceived by the team) and on team performance did persist 
over time – however, only when culture strength was high.  
 
 




Univariate Test Results of the Multivariate Multiple Regression Analysis after Eliminating two Teams  
Criterion variable Predictor b SE(b) β t p ηp2 
Height of the structure1 Error management culture4 2.53 4.78 0.10 0.53 .60 .01 
 Culture/climate strength 231.68 208.30 1.49 1.11 .27 .02 
 
Error management culture 
X Culture/climate strength -70.31 57.13 -1.73 -1.23 .22 .03 
 
 
      
Number of construction pieces2 Error management culture -3.67 6.40 -0.11 -0.57 .57 .01 
 Culture/climate strength -0.30 278.84 -0.00 -0.00 .99 .00 
 
Error management culture 
X Culture/climate strength 0.08 76.47 0.00 0.00 .99 .00 
 
 
      
Running time of marble3 Error management culture -2.08 2.43 -0.15 -0.86 .40 .01 
 Culture/climate strength -380.73 106.05 -4.37 -3.59 .00 .19 
  
Error management culture 
X Culture/climate strength 99.38 29.08 4.35 3.42 .00 .18 
Notes. N = 174 participants (58 teams). 

















(as perceived by the team)
Figure 4.6. Interaction effect of error management culture (as perceived by the team) 
and culture strength on team performance in Task 2. 
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Discussion 
Error management culture is a popular concept that many organizations adopt. Field 
studies have shown beneficial effects of error management culture on performance. However, 
experimental evidence on how to induce an error management culture, and whether the error 
management culture−performance relationship can also be observed under standardized 
conditions, was lacking. In the present study, we successfully manipulated (a) error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) in teams by fostering exploration (i.e., with a 
manipulation that is based on error management training instructions), (b) partially replicated 
the beneficial effect of error management culture on team performance in creative problem-
solving tasks, and (c) showed that inducing an error management culture in teams by fostering 
exploration can increase performance in a creative problem-solving task. However, (d) the 
effects of our manipulation on error management culture (as perceived by the team) and team 
performance persisted over time only when culture strength (i.e., the agreement between 
groups members about the culture) was high. In the following, we will discuss our findings in 
greater detail. 
Theoretical Contributions 
From a theoretical perspective, we contribute to the literature on error management 
culture and organizational culture by examining error management culture under experimental 
conditions. In our study, we managed to affect participants' common perception of error 
management culture with manipulations based on error training instructions, even though, 
unlike in traditional teams, participants in our study had not known each other before, did not 
share a common culture, and interacted only for a rather short period of time (approximately 
10-20 minutes). In organizations, the organizational culture is presumably engrained and 
internalized by the members of the organization. On the contrary, in our study, culture had to 
be newly established. Regardless of the short time period of our study, our manipulation of 
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error management culture based on error training instructions affected participants' common 
perception of the groups' error culture (i.e., error management culture) and even team 
performance in the first task, which is striking. Our results are in line with the findings of error 
management training research (e.g., Keith & Frese, 2005, 2008). Error management training 
research found error management training instructions that foster exploration to increase 
individuals' task performance (e.g., Keith & Frese, 2005, 2008).  
However, the question remains why our second error management manipulation that 
was based on normative social influence did not foster error management culture (as perceived 
by the team) and performance. This can be for the following reasons. First, the social impact 
theory (Latané, 1981) postulates three factors that determine the effectiveness of normative 
social influence or whether participants conform to group norms: (a) strength, (b) immediacy, 
and (c) number. Strength is defined as “the salience, power, importance, or intensity of a given 
source to the target” (Latané, 1981, p. 344), which is determined by factors such as the source's 
age, economic status, or intellect. Immediacy is the “closeness in space or time and absence of 
intervening barriers or filters” (Latané, 1981, p. 344). Number stands for the number of group 
members that are potential influence sources. The higher the strength, immediacy and number 
of group members is, the more people will conform to group norms. However, the number of 
group members only affects conformity to a certain point: conformity to norms does not 
increase anymore when groups have more than three to five people (e.g., Asch, 1955; Bond, 
2005). While two factors, number and immediacy, apply to the teams in our study as they were 
face to face and consisted of three members, strength (i.e., personal importance) may not apply 
to our teams. It can be argued whether a team formed for experimental purposes will be 
considered important for team members. It is also debatable whether the external source of the 
norm that shall be internalized was seen as important by team members in our study.  
Second, task importance can also affect conformity to group norms (Baron, Vandello, 
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& Brunsman, 1996). Whether and how important participants perceive a task in an 
experimental situation is questionable. Third, it is possible that normative social influence is 
more effective when only one particular and precise behavior pattern is communicated as group 
norm that is easy to implement (e.g., reusing the towels as previous guests did helps to save 
the environment; Goldstein et al., 2008). However, it could be that the error management 
manipulation that was based on normative social influence did have an effect on error 
management culture (as perceived by the team), but the effect was not strong enough to be 
statistically significant. Descriptively, the results (see Figure 4.2, Panel a) indicate that this 
manipulation did have a weak effect on teams' perception of error management culture. 
It also has to be noted that while we managed to affect participants common perception 
of error management culture in their teams with a manipulation based on error management 
training instructions and thus foster team performance in the first team task (Marshmallow 
Challenge), the results for the second team task (marble run task) remained only partially 
stable. Teams' perception of error management culture and team performance in the second 
team task differed between experimental conditions (i.e., manipulations) only when culture 
strength was high. A potential explanation for this result is that the effect of our error 
management culture manipulation on error management culture (as perceived by the team) in 
the first team task was only an indicator of a superficial compliance with the instructions rather 
than an indicator of actual change in attitudes towards errors or culture. However, this would 
contradict the results we found while testing for the potential moderator effect of culture or 
climate strength (Schneider et al., 2002; Gonzáles-Romá et al., 2002). We did find an 
interaction effect of error management culture (as perceived by the team) and culture strength 
on one of our performance-indicators in Task 2, namely the running time of the marble. This 
is in line with the suggestion of Schneider and colleagues (2002) that “the commonly held 
assumption that climates (and cultures) persist over time (e.g., Schein, 1992) must be modified 
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to say strong climates (and cultures) persist over time” (p. 227).  Another explanation for our 
results may lie in the nature of our teams. As mentioned above, the teams in our study were 
newly formed of people who did not interact prior to task engagement, thus did not have a 
common culture. Consequently, unlike in traditional teams, the groups' culture had to be newly 
formed and unfold. It is possible that our manipulation of error management culture was not 
strong enough to impact participants' perception of error management culture, and thus team 
performance in the long term.  Also, the interactive approach to the etiology of culture sees the 
formation of culture as an interactive learning process between members (Ashforth, 1985; 
Moran & Volkwein, 1992). It is questionable whether participants have enough possibilities to 
interact and learn in a short-term study like ours.  
Furthermore, it is debatable whether a strong change will take place in response to 
external influences, such as our manipulations, or whether the interaction and learning 
processes of group members are more important. However, several authors stressed the 
important role of the group's former (in our case the role of the experimenter), that is, the 
external influence in the formation and change process (e.g., Schein, 1983, Gagliardi, 1986). 
Moreover, in their study, Gonzáles-Romá and colleagues (2002) found that leaders' informing 
behavior positively correlates with culture or climate strength. Furthermore, van Dyck, 
Dimitrova, de Korne, and Hiddema (2013) found that the leaders' active reinforcement of 
priority of safety promotes error management. Bligh, Kohles, and Yan (2018) suggest that 
especially the transformational leadership style fosters attitudes towards error learning. 
Whether participants actually considered the experimenter as the founder or leader of the group 
in our study and thus, whether the founder's beliefs, and values were of importance for the 
group may be an issue.  
In sum, our results indicate that it is more difficult to induce error management culture 
in teams than we thought. This is somewhat surprising considering how quick group norms can 
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form according to social psychology. For example, in Sherif's (1935; 1936) conformity or 
autokinetic experiments, groups quickly developed a group norm and also behaved according 
to it. Tajfel's minimal group paradigm (1970) also suggests that developing common perception 
or assumptions is a quick process. Even in excessive minimal group conditions participants 
almost immediately favor the own group and discriminate others, which indicates that some 
shared perception establishes quite quickly.  
Our finding that error management culture was positively related to team performance 
in a creative problem solving task (note that in the second team task only when culture strength 
was high and only for one indicator of team performance) is consistent with the findings of 
previous research in organizations (e.g., Fischer et al., 2018; van Dyck et al., 2005) that indicate 
that error management culture is beneficial for performance-related outcomes. In this respect, 
the present research can be seen as an experimental replication of previous correlational field 
studies. Nonetheless, our experiment should not only be considered as a replication of previous 
results, but as complementary to previous correlational research for the following reasons. 
First, as noted above, field studies have the advantage of high ecological validity, which 
may come at the expense of internal validity. By investigating error management culture 
experimentally under standardized conditions, it is possible to account for confounding factors 
that can hardly be avoided in field research. In organizations, several confounding factors could 
influence organizational performance, other than error management culture, which leaves the 
question of causality unanswered (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Second, previous field 
studies have mainly investigated “traditional” organizations (and teams), where a common 
view on errors is most likely engrained. However, teams newly form and change frequently. 
Furthermore, in recent years, an increasing amount of work is conducted outside traditional 
organizational structures. Many teams are formed for a specific purpose or interact only for the 
duration of the task. In such teams, shared norms and practices regarding errors are not yet 
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established. Our study investigated such teams and showed that even newly formed teams can 
benefit from the favorable effects error management culture. 
Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research 
One strength of our study is that we used different sources for our variables, this way 
eliminating the common source bias, which is a common problem in many studies. Error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) was an aggregate measure of the respective 
team members. Our dependent variable, task performance, (e.g., height of the structure in the 
Marshmallow challenge), was an objective rating measure.  
Another strength of our study is that participants worked on actual tasks that required 
creative problem-solving, namely the Marshmallow challenge and the marble run task. This 
way, we were able to complement advantages of an experimental setting, such as 
standardization, with advantages of field studies, such as task engagement. We hope that this 
way, we were able to contribute to generalizability and high applicability of our results. 
However, we encourage future studies to investigate whether error management culture is also 
beneficial for different tasks, for example, tasks that require rational problem-solving instead 
of creative problem-solving.  
Rational problem-solving tasks presumably require a greater extent of convergent 
thinking, while creative problem-solving tasks require a greater extent of divergent thinking. 
Convergent thinking is considered as a type of thinking that focuses on generating one possible 
conclusion, a single correct answer to a clearly defined problem (Guilford, 1957). “Thinking 
is channeled or controlled in the direction of that answer” (Guilford, 1957, p. 274). In contrast, 
in divergent thinking, “there is much searching or going off in various directions” (Guilford, 
1957, p. 274). There are multiple possible solutions to an open-ended problem (Guilford, 
1957). An example for divergent thinking is brainstorming. Divergent thinking can easily be 
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associated with making errors as part of idea generation. Thus, an environment that does not 
punish errors (i.e., error management culture) may facilitate divergent thinking and finding a 
solution to a creative problem-solving task. Convergent thinking uses a more controlled, logical 
approach that may not allow the occurrence of errors in the process of idea-generation in 
rational problem-solving tasks. Moreover, the errors made in the process may not even be 
visible. However, despite best efforts, errors will prevail (e.g., Reason, 1997; Zhao & Olivera, 
2006). We thus assume that error management culture will also be beneficial for performance 
in rational problem-solving tasks by fostering open communication and an environment where 
errors are not punished. 
Furthermore, in our tasks, participants could clearly see and know when they made an 
error (i.e., the structure collapsed). The tasks themselves provided feedback that someone has 
made an error. Future studies may investigate if making an error and receiving feedback is 
necessary for error management culture to unfold its beneficial effects on performance. 
Possibly, it may even be enough to have an environment where errors are considered as chances 
to learn rather than as threats (e.g., an error management culture) to improve performance. 
Another strength of our study is that teams in our experiment were newly formed, thus 
did not have an already established error (management) culture. Field studies have the 
advantage to investigate traditional teams which have an already established error 
(management) culture and thus change processes. Newly formed teams in our experiment 
allowed us to investigate whether it is even possible to establish an error management culture 
at all. Furthermore, conducting our study with newly formed teams allowed us to ascribe the 
results regarding error management culture (as perceived by the team) and team performance 
to our manipulations and not to the teams' previously established error (management) culture. 
Moreover, in research, replication is “a viable antidote to what Bliese and Wang (2019) 
term ‘origination bias,’ or in other words, ‘the practice of viewing findings from a single, 
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original study as being almost sacred,’ even if these findings were exploratory in nature” 
(Bamberger, 2019, p. 104). Thus, to reduce the likelihood of false-positive findings, replication 
is essential. We were able to successfully replicate the findings of previous field studies (e.g., 
Fischer et al., 2018; van Dyck et al., 2005) in an experiment under standardized conditions. 
Moreover, we were able to extend these results by successfully manipulating error management 
culture.  
Nonetheless, while our study has a lot of strengths, we believe that some questions 
remain to be answered. First, it remains to be tested whether our intervention for inducing error 
management culture can also be applied in organizations where teams presumably have an 
established error culture. The question remains whether our interventions are strong enough to 
overrule already established norms and practices of how to deal with errors. Second, as the 
effect of our manipulation on error management culture (as perceived by the team) was only 
durable for a second team task when culture strength was high, future research could probe 
whether reminding participants of our manipulations or strengthening our manipulations would 
lead to longer-lasting effects. Third, as our teams only worked together for a short period of 
time, future research could investigate teams for a longer period of time. This would give 
organizations an idea about how long interventions regarding a cultural change should be in 
effect. Fourth, in recent years, virtual teams, “groups of geographically and/or organizationally 
dispersed coworkers that are assembled using a combination of telecommunications and 
information technologies to accomplish an organizational task”, have arisen (Townsed, 
DeMarie, & Hendrickson, 1998, p. 18). It remains to be tested whether our results also apply 
to virtual teams, where communication may be not as rich (Hightower, Sayeed, Warketin, & 
McHaney, 1998) and more restricted than face-to-face communication. This is due to time lags 
(e.g., e-mail) in communication and fewer possibilities for informal communication. Conflicts 
that potentially arise in such teams are harder to resolve (Blackburn, Furst, & Rosen, 2003), as 
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team members cannot rely on traditional social cues and mechanism (Montoya-Weiss, Massey, 
& Song, 2001) and there is a greater potential for misunderstandings (Sproull & Kiesler 1986). 
Fifth, the present study does not shed light on underlying processes of the error management 
culture and performance relationship. We strongly encourage future studies to investigate 
potential underlying mechanisms of the error management culture-performance relationship. 
Given that error communication represents one of the most important practice of error 
management culture (van Dyck et al., 2005), we believe that communication may be a key 
variable. 
Practical Contributions 
We believe that the results of our studies are highly relevant for practitioners. Our 
findings of the beneficial effects of error management culture on performance highlight the 
importance to include error management culture in organizational development programs 
Furthermore, our study sheds light on how difficult it is to induce an error management culture 
in teams. While it is relatively easy to persuade someone to follow instructions and behave 
according to them in the short-term, changing deeper rooted beliefs and values about something 
might be more difficult and a longer process. This is particularly important for understanding 
the drivers of organizational development and change processes.  
We encourage organizations to explicitly include the topic of errors and error 
management in their ongoing leadership and employee development programs (e.g., in 
modules on error management in leadership training) specifically directed at improving error 
management culture. Such an intervention should explore the topic of error management 
culture and cover different aspects of the principles of error management culture. As our results 
showed, encouraging participants to explore, experiment, and learn from errors may benefit 
the team's perception of error management culture, and improve their performance. Thus, these 
aspects should be stressed particularly in an intervention with the goal of establishing error 
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management culture. Also, participants should be confronted with the topic over and over again 
and should actively take part in problem-solving tasks related to the topic. Thereby, participants 
have to interact and can commonly learn new practices and values in line with error 
management culture. Moreover, the leader (or founder) of the team should take an active role 
in the emergence or change process. Changing the deeper assumptions of members using an 
external force may not be as successful as when the values and beliefs of an interacting leader 
(and group member) are stressed.  
In our experiment with newly formed teams, we successfully manipulated teams' 
perception of error management culture by fostering exploration in an attempt to 
experimentally induce an error management culture. Furthermore, we experimentally 
replicated the beneficial effect of error management culture on performance found in field 
studies in a creative problem-solving task. We believe that our study provides important 
implications and starting points for both theory and practice regarding error management 
culture.  
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5 
Overall Conclusion, Implications,  
and Future Directions 
1 
“From error to error, one discovers the entire truth.” 
(Sigmund Freud) 
 
he topic of learning from errors at work is increasingly gaining attention in applied 
psychology and management research. While scholars agree that errors can be a 
rich source of learning (e.g., Dormann & Frese, 1994; Edmondson, 1996; Ellis, 
Carette, Anseel, & Lievens, 2014; Frese & Keith, 2015; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 
2003; Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996; Keith & Frese, 2008; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Zakay, 
Ellis, & Shevalsky, 2004), little is known about the error characteristics and contextual factors 
that may affect the amount of learning from errors. The first aim of this dissertation was to 
investigate the role of error characteristics and contextual factors in learning from errors. In 
particular, our first category of research questions asked whether the amount of learning from 
errors depends on the severity of error consequences, the agent who made the error, the 
organizational culture (e.g., error management culture), and if there are differences between 
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countries in learning from errors. We addressed the first category of our research questions in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
In Chapter 4, we shifted our focus from learning from errors to error management 
culture and addressed the second category of our research questions. Previous field studies 
have shown that error management culture benefits organizational outcomes, such as safety, 
innovativeness, and performance (Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Keith & Frese, 2011; van Dyck, 
Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005; Fischer, Frese, Mertins, & Hardt-Gawron, 2018). The 
question, however, remained, whether it is possible to induce an error management culture and 
if so, how. The second aim of this dissertation was therefore to explore whether and how we 
can induce an error management culture in teams. 
Summary of Results 
In Chapter 2, we reported two studies in which, by means of two vignette experiments, 
we investigated the assumptions that more learning occurs from errors with severe 
consequences as opposed to mild consequences, and when the error was made by oneself as 
opposed to by someone else. As expected, people learned more from errors in terms of affective 
error learning and cognitive error learning if consequences were severe (Study 1 and 2) and if 
the error was made by themselves (Study 2). 
In Chapter 3, we tested the assumption that more learning from errors occurs (in terms 
of affective error learning) when more error management culture is experienced. Furthermore, 
we investigated whether there are country differences in learning from errors and if so, whether 
error management culture mediates the relationship between country and learning from errors. 
We also aimed at replicating the pattern of results regarding severity of error consequences and 
agent found in Chapter 2. To test our assumptions and research questions, we conducted 
vignette experiments in three different countries: the United States, Hungary, and Germany. 
As expected, people learned more from errors if consequences were severe, if the error was 
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made by themselves, and when more error management culture was experienced. Furthermore, 
we found differences between countries in that participants from the United States learned 
more from errors than participants from Hungary or Germany. This relationship was mediated 
by error management culture.   
In Chapter 4, we shifted the focus from the individual to the team level and tested our 
second category of research questions. In particular, we tested whether the beneficial effects of 
error management culture not only apply to learning from errors (as shown in Chapter 3), but 
also to performance-related outcomes such as performance in a creative problem-solving task. 
Furthermore, we tested whether it is possible to induce error management culture in teams. To 
test our assumptions and research questions, we conducted a laboratory experiment with newly 
formed teams, in which we aimed to induce an error management culture. Furthermore, we 
tested whether we would also find the beneficial effect of error management culture on 
performance reported in previous field studies (e.g., van Dyck et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 2018), 
under standardized experimental conditions. We were able to successfully manipulate error 
management culture (as perceived by the team) in teams by fostering exploration and learning 
from errors. Furthermore, we found error management culture to be beneficial for performance 
in a creative problem-solving task. However, these effects persisted over time only when 
culture strength (i.e., agreement about culture between group members) was high. In the next 
sections, we discuss our results in greater detail and provide theoretical and practical 
implications, and future research directions. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
This dissertation addressed research questions concerning error characteristics and 
context factors that support learning from errors, and performance effects of an error 
management culture in teams. Our results regarding learning from errors indicate that not the 
error per se and its informational value determines whether people use it for learning, as 
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hypothesized by some researchers (e.g., Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000; Heimbeck et al., 2003; 
Sitkin, 1992). Rather, relatively superficial error characteristics and context factors, such as the 
severity of the error consequence, the agent who made the error or the perceived organizational 
culture (e.g., error management culture), affect learning from errors. Our studies regarding 
learning from errors (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) go beyond previous research and contribute to 
the existing literature in the following ways. First, our studies add to the relatively scarce body 
of research concerning error characteristics and contextual factors that may affect learning from 
errors (Homsma, van Dyck, De Gilder, Koopman, & Elfring, 2009; Zakay et al., 2004). Second, 
previous field studies remained inconclusive in regard to causality. We addressed this issue by 
using an experimental vignette-methodology. Third, we considered factors that go beyond the 
error itself, such as the context in which the error was made.  
Understanding which factors (i.e., error characteristics or contextual factors) affect 
learning from errors enables taking advantage of the learning potential of errors. Organizations 
may develop interventions that explicitly address the topic of errors and actively encourage 
learning from errors. To fully exploit the learning potential inherent in errors, organizations 
should raise attention towards errors with mild consequences and errors made by others. As 
our results showed, errors with mild consequences and errors made by others do not attract as 
much attention, and thus do not lead to as much learning as errors with severe consequences or 
errors made by oneself. Furthermore, our results highlight the importance of error management 
culture (as perceived by the team) for learning from errors. Organizations should foster an error 
management culture, a culture in which errors may be openly discussed and are considered as 
a chance to learn. Organizations should also take into account culture and country specific 
characteristics, norms, and habits, as our results showed that countries differ in the amount of 
learning from errors. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first ones that aimed at inducing an 
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error management culture in teams under standardized conditions. By studying how an error 
management culture can be induced, we aimed to (a) shed light on how the concept of error 
management culture manifests in teams, and (b) answer questions regarding the drivers of 
change and innovation effects. Furthermore, (c) our results should benefit practitioners, as they 
give starting points for effective interventions that aim at inducing error management culture 
in teams and organizations. By using an error management culture manipulation based on error 
management instructions, that is, encouraging participants to explore, experiment, and learn 
from errors, we managed to manipulate error management culture (as perceived by the team) 
in our study. However, the effect persisted over time (that is, for a second team task) only when 
culture strength (Schneider, Salvaggio, and Subirats, 2002) was high. Establishing a culture 
(i.e., shared norms, practices) may be more difficult than previous research indicates (e.g., 
Sherif, 1935; Tajfel, 1970). This has important implications both for social psychological and 
organizational culture research and also for practice regarding organizational culture change. 
Our results regarding the beneficial effect of error management culture on team 
performance in a creative problem-solving task are in line with empirical evidence that 
suggests error management culture to be beneficial for organizational outcomes such as safety, 
innovativeness, and performance in terms of firm profitability (e.g., Fischer et al., 2018; 
Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Keith & Frese, 2011; van Dyck et al., 2005). In this respect, our study 
experimentally replicates the findings of previous correlational field studies. Nonetheless, our 
results should be considered to be a complement to previous correlational research for the 
following two reasons. First, by investigating error management culture experimentally under 
standardized conditions, it is possible to establish causality (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) 
and take into account confounding factors that can hardly be avoided in field research. Second, 
our study investigated newly formed teams instead of “traditional” teams, as did previous 
studies. In a rapidly changing world, new teams are formed quite often, and changes in team 
 Chapter 5  143 
structure are common. It is therefore particularly important to investigate teams in which a 
culture is not yet established. Our results showed that newly formed teams can also benefit 
from the favorable effects of error management culture.  
In sum, we showed that error management culture is not only beneficial for learning 
from errors, but also for performance. Again, we encourage organizations to develop 
interventions that aim at inducing error management culture, and also to explicitly include the 
topic of errors and error management in their ongoing development programs. Such 
interventions should introduce the concept of error management culture and explore different 
aspects of the principles of error management culture. The interventions should also discuss 
which error, person, and organizational characteristics are beneficial or a hindrance to 
constructively dealing with error. Furthermore, they should also introduce different strategies 
on how these hindrances can be overcome. We provide a starting point that outlines which 
interventions in organizational development programs should be considered and included. 
Future Research Directions 
Although the research presented in this dissertation provides several theoretical, 
empirical, and practical implications, it also leads to new research questions that remain to be 
answered. Regarding learning from errors, we encourage future research to develop a learning 
measure that on the one hand allows to be employed in standardized settings such as 
experiments, but on the other hand has higher ecological validity than the measures we 
employed (self-reports and recall of error situations) in our studies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
Future research may also investigate other error characteristics than severity of error 
consequences and agent that may affect learning. Errors may differ with regard to the richness 
of the information inherent in errors or with regard to the type of lesson to be learned. Future 
research may also explore the role of person attributes in learning from errors, such as 
neuroticism. We suggest that people who are high on neuroticism will feel particularly 
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threatened by errors they make. This increased threat could lead to maladaptive reactions 
including rigidity and defensiveness. This could, in turn, impede learning. Future studies are 
also encouraged to investigate learning from errors in other countries than the countries 
examined in this dissertation to broaden the knowledge about country specific issues.  
In regard to our results that error management culture positively relates to performance 
in teams, it remains to be tested which intervening processes underlie this relationship. We 
suggest communication to be a potential mediator of the error management culture-
performance relationship. In teams high in error management culture, team members should 
not fear blame for unconventional or erroneous statements. Such statements may foster 
innovative ideas, and the innovative ideas may enhance the team's performance. We also 
encourage future studies to investigate whether the beneficial effect of error management 
culture on performance also applies to other sort of tasks, for example, tasks that require 
rational problem-solving instead of creative problem-solving.  
Also, more research is needed regarding how an error management culture can be 
induced. Our instructions give a starting point for a successful intervention that aims at 
establishing error management culture. It remains to be tested whether our manipulations could 
also be applied to induce an error management culture in teams that already have an established 
error culture. In addition, it is not clear whether our interventions are strong enough to overrule 
an already established error culture. Moreover, future research could investigate facilitating 
person characteristics (e.g., personality traits) and team characteristics (e.g., team reflexivity) 
for inducing an error management culture. 
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Appendix A 
An example of a vignette (error situation) we presented participants 
You/A close colleague of yours/An employee of a competing company have/has to hold 
a presentation in front of a customer. Depending on the outcome of the talk, you/he/she can 
count on an acquisition. You/he/she make/makes the following mistake. Despite your/his/her 
preparation, you/he/she cannot answer the customer's questions adequately. The customer is 
thus very dissatisfied with the performance of the company. 
Mild error consequence: 
However, the customer gives you/your close colleague/the employee of the competing 
company some time and you/he/she can submit the answers within the next few days. 
Severe error consequence: 
The customer is so dissatisfied with you/your close colleague/the employee of the 
competing company that the acquisition does not happen. 
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Appendix B 
Manipulations used in Chapter 4 
Error management culture manipulation based on error management training instructions 
German (original) version English (translated) version 
Machen Sie bei der Aufgabe so viele Fehler 
wie möglich! Fehler sind etwas Gutes! Denn 
aus Fehlern können Sie lernen! Probieren Sie 
immer wieder aus, ob der Turm schon stabil 
genug für den Marshmallow ist. Falls der 
Turm den Marshmallow noch nicht tragen 
kann – freuen Sie sich, denn Sie können aus 
Ihren Fehlern lernen! Besprechen Sie in der 
Gruppe, was Sie falsch gemacht haben, und 
gehen Sie offen mit Fehlern um. Nur so 
können Sie aus Ihren Fehlern lernen. Sie 
können 10 Minuten lang herumprobieren– 
Sie bekommen sogar immer wieder 20 neue 
Spaghetti! Sie können also verschiedenste 
Konstruktionen ausprobieren. Je mehr Sie 
ausprobieren, desto mehr Fehler werden Sie 
machen – und je mehr Fehler Sie machen, 
desto besser können Sie werden! So können 
Sie es schaffen, den höchsten Turm zu 
bauen! 
Make as many errors as you can while 
working on the task! Errors are a good thing 
as you can learn from them! Test again and 
again whether the structure is already stable 
enough to hold the marshmallow. If the 
structure cannot yet carry the marshmallow - 
be happy because you made an error, and 
from your errors you can learn! Discuss in 
your group what went wrong. Be open about 
dealing with errors. This is the only way to 
learn from your errors. You can try around 
for 10 minutes - you even get 20 new 
spaghetti every time! Thus, you can try out a 
variety of constructs. The more you try 
around, the more errors you will make - and 
the more errors you make, the better you can 
get! This way you will be able to build the 
tallest structure! 
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Error management culture manipulation based on normative social influence 
German (original) version English (translated) version 
Machen Sie bei der Aufgabe so viele Fehler 
wie möglich! Fehler sind etwas Gutes! Denn 
aus Fehlern können Sie lernen! In vorigen 
Durchgängen dieser Challenge haben wir 
uns angesehen, was die erfolgreichsten 
Gruppen - also die, die höchsten Türme 
gebaut haben - ausgemacht hat. Dabei haben 
wir gesehen: Die erfolgreichsten Gruppen 
haben am meisten ausprobiert und am 
meisten Fehler gemacht! 90% der 
erfolgreichsten Gruppen haben offen über 
Fehler diskutiert. So war es möglich, als 
Team aus Fehlern zu lernen und sich weiter 
zu verbessern. Und das gilt nicht nur für die 
Marshmallow-Challenge; Studien haben 
gezeigt, dass auch Unternehmen, die Fehler 
als Lernchance sehen, wesentlich 
erfolgreicher sind. Fehler führen zu kreativen 
Ideen, zu Innovationen, und somit zu 
besseren Leistungen! Wenn auch Ihr Team 
Fehler als etwas Hilfreiches betrachtet, 
können Sie es schaffen, den höchsten Turm 
zu bauen! 
Make as many errors as you can while 
working on the task! Errors are a good thing 
as you can learn from them! In previous 
rounds of this Marshmallow Challenge, we 
had a look at what constituted the most 
successful groups. We saw that the most 
successful groups made the most trials and 
also made the most errors! 90% of the most 
successful groups openly discussed errors. 
That way it was possible to learn from errors 
as a team and to improve further. This does 
not only apply to the Marshmallow 
Challenge; Studies have shown that 
companies that see errors as a learning 
opportunity are much more successful. 
Errors lead to creative ideas, to innovations, 
and thus to better performance! If your team 
sees errors as helpful, you will be able to 
build the tallest structure! 
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Error prevention culture manipulation 
German (original) version English (translated) version 
Versuchen Sie, von Anfang an alles richtig 
zu machen. Fehler behindern Sie bei der 
Arbeit. Es kostet Zeit und Energie, die 
Ursachen für Fehler zu suchen. Fehler 
verursachen Stress – unnötiger Stress, der 
vermeidbar ist! Sie sollten also am besten gar 
keine Fehler machen. Konzentrieren Sie sich 
stattdessen direkt darauf, den höchsten Turm 
zu bauen. Wenn doch etwas schiefläuft, 
verschwenden Sie keine Zeit mit dem Fehler. 
Als Sieger-Team brauchen Sie das gar nicht! 
Die besten Teams machen immer alles 
richtig. So auch Sie: Machen Sie von Anfang 
an alles richtig, dann wird Ihr Turm auch der 
höchste werden! 
Try to do everything right from the 
beginning. Errors hinder you at working. It 
takes time and energy to find the causes of 
errors. Errors cause stress - unnecessary 
stress that could be avoided! It would be best 
if you wouldn't make any errors at all. 
Instead, focus on building the tallest structure 
immediately. If something goes wrong, don't 
waste time on the error. As a winning team, 
you don't need that! The best teams always 
do everything right. Thus, you too: Do 
everything right from the start, and your 
structure will be the tallest structure! 
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Appendix C 
List of variables assessed in Chapter 2  
(with additional variables assessed for exploratory purposes) 
Construct Measure/source Study  Comments 
Dependent variable (DV)    
Affective error learning  Learning from errors subscale 
of the Error Orientation 
Questionnaire (Rybowiak et 
al., 1999) 
1, 2 We used three of 4 
items of the subscale 
Cognitive error learning Recall task with guiding 
questions (we asked for the 
error and the situational 
context in which it occurred as 
well as the error consequences) 
1, 2 Self-developed 
Cognitive error learning Cued recall task with multiple-
choice test items (self-
developed) 




items in Study 1 but 
the items were too 
easy (75 to 90% 
correct answers 
across conditions) 
and produced ceiling 
effects. 
Multiple choice 
items were presented 
after the free recall 
task 
Person characteristics/traits   
Negative affectivity PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) 1, 2 German version by 




Satow (2017) 1, 2 Freely available 
German cognitive 
ability test. Was used 
as a filler task. 
In Study 2 we only 
used the subscale 
numerical skills 
Error orientation 
(learning from errors) 
Error Orientation 
Questionnaire (Rybowiak et 
al., 1999) 
1, 2 We only used the 
subscale learning 
from errors. Partial 
overlap of item 
content with DV 
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Conscientiousness (Big 
Five) 
BFI (John & Srivastava, 1999) 1, 2 BFI German version 
by Lang et al. (2001) 
Neuroticism (Big Five) BFI (John & Srivastava, 1999) 1, 2 BFI German version 
by Lang et al. (2001) 
Climate/culture perceptions   
Error management 
culture 
van Dyck et al. (2005) 1, 2 Partial overlap of 
item content with 
DV  
Other    
Manipulation checks Three self-developed items: 
e.g., “How negative do you 
evaluate the described 
situation?” 
1, 2 One Kunin Item 
(Kunin, 1955)  
Bogus items Meade & Craig (2012) 2  
 
References 
John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five Trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and 
theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: 
Theory and research (pp. 102-138). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Krohne, H., W., Egloff, B., Kohlmann, C.-W., & Tausch, A. (1996). Untersuchungen mit einer 
deutschen Version der „Positive und Negative Affect Schedule“ (PANAS) [Studies 
using a German version of the positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS)]. 
Diagnostica, 42(2), 139-156. 
Kunin, T. (1955). The construction of a new type of attitude measure. Personnel Psychology, 
8, 65-77. 
Lang, F. R., Lüdtke, O., & Asendorpf, J. B. (2001). Testgüte und psychometrische Äquivalenz 
der deutschen Version des Big Five Inventory (BFI) bei jungen, mittelalten und alten 
Erwachsenen [Test quality and psychometric equivalence of the German version of the 
Big Five Inventory (BFI) in young, middle-aged, and older adults]. Diagnostica., 47(3), 
111 – 121. 
Meade, A. W., & Craig, S. B. (2012). Identifying careless responses in survey data. 
Psychological Methods, 17(3), 437–455. 
 Appendix  153 
Rybowiak, V., Garst, H., Frese, M., & Batinic, B. (1999). Error orientation questionnaire 
(EOQ): Reliability, validity, and different language equivalence. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 20(4), 527-547. 
Satow, L. (2017). Allgemeiner Intelligenz-Test (AIT): Testmanual und Normen [General 
intelligence test (AIT): Testmanual and norms]. Unpublished instrument. Retrieved 
from https://www.drsatow.de/ 
van Dyck, C., Frese, M., Baer, M., & Sonnentag, S. (2005). Organizational error management 
culture and its impact on performance: A two-study replication. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 90(6), 1228-1240. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. 
  
 Appendix  154 
Appendix D 
List of variables assessed in Chapter 3  
(with additional variables assessed for exploratory purposes) 
Construct Measure/source Comments 
Dependent variable (DV)   
Affective error learning  Learning from errors subscale of 
the Error Orientation 
Questionnaire (Rybowiak et al., 
1999) 
We used three of 4 
items of the subscale 
Blaming after an error One item from Edmondson (1999) 
and four self-developed items  
 
Planning (secondary error 
prevention) 
Three self-developed items  
Defensiveness (self- and 
other-blame) 
CERQ (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007) We only used the 
subscales self-blame 
and blaming others 
Working harder intentions Raver et al. (2012) We used three of 6 
items 
Person characteristics/traits  
Negative affectivity PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) German version by 
Krohne et al. (1996). 
Hungarian version by 
Rózsa et al. (2008) 
Error orientation (learning 
from errors) 
Error Orientation Questionnaire 
(Rybowiak et al., 1999) 
We only used the 
subscale learning from 
errors. Partial overlap 




BFI (John & Srivastava, 1999) BFI German version by 
Lang et al. (2001) 
Neuroticism (Big Five) BFI (John & Srivastava, 1999) BFI German version by 
Lang et al. (2001) 
Goal orientation VandeWalle (1997) German version by 
Heimbeck et al. (2003). 
We only used the 
subscales learning and 
avoid goal orientation 
Perfectionism Frost Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al., 
1990) 
German version by 
Stöber (1995). 
We only used the 
subscale concern over 
mistakes and two items 
of the subscale doubt 
Competitiveness Competitiveness Index (Houston 
et al., 2002) 
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Implicit theory of ability Chiu, Hong, & Dweck (1997) German version by 
Spinath & Schöne 
(2003) 
Climate/culture perceptions  
Error management culture van Dyck et al. (2005) Partial overlap of item 
content with DV  
Psychological safety Edmondson (1999) German version by 
Baer & Frese (2003) 
Blaming culture Gao et al. (2014)  
Error prevention culture Four items from Gao et al. (2014) 
and seven self-developed items. 
 
Planning for uncertainty Skorka (2006)  
Uncertainty avoidance GLOBE (House et al., 2004)  
Other   
Manipulation checks Two self-developed items: e.g., 
“How negative do you evaluate 
the described situation?” 
 
Authenticity check Three self-developed items: e.g., 
“I perceived the depicted error 
situation as realistic.” 
 
Bogus items Meade & Craig (2012)  
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Appendix E 
List of variables assessed in Chapter 4  
(with additional variables assessed for exploratory purposes) 
Construct Measure/source Comments 
Dependent variable (DV)   
Team performance (Task 1) 1) Height of the structure (cm) 
2) Did the structure collapse or 
not (in 30 seconds) 
Objective measures 
Team performance (Task 2) 1) Height of the structure (cm) 
2) Number of pieces used for 
construction 
3) Running time of marble (sec) 
Objective measures 
Person characteristics/traits  
Error orientation  Error Orientation Questionnaire 
(Rybowiak et al., 1999) 
 
Climate/culture perceptions  
Error management culture 
(Task 1 and Task 2) 
van Dyck et al. (2005) Partial overlap of item 
content with DV  
Error aversion culture (Task 
1 and Task 2) 
van Dyck et al. (2005)  
Culture or climate strength 
(Task 1 and Task 2) 
rwg(j) (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 
1984, 1993) 
 
Other   
Manipulation check: 
Number of trials (Task 1 
and Task 2) (second 
manipulation check) 
We counted the number of trials 
participants needed till they 
arrived at the final solution 
Objective measure 
Goal commitment Hollenbeck, Williams, & Klein 
(1989) 
We only used three 
items of the scale 
Task familiarity (Task 1 & 
Task 2) 
Three self-developed items: e.g., 
“Were you familiar with the 
“Marshmallow Challenge/marble 
run” task?” 
Due to poor reliability 
one item was deleted 
from the scale 
Familiarity with team 
members 
One self-developed item: “How 
well do you know the two other 
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